A MODEST REPLY TO

Certaine Answeres, which *Mr. Gataker* B. D. in his Treatise of the Nature, & vse of Lotts, *giveth to* Arguments in a Dialogue concerning the Vnlawfulnes of *Games* consisting in *Chance*.

And

Aunsweres to his Reasons allowing *Lusorious Lotts*, as not evill in themselves.

By

James Balmford, minister of Iesus Christ.

2. Cor. 13. 8.

We can doe nothing against, but for the truth.

Ephes. 5. 11.

Have no fellowship with the vnfruitfull workes of Darkenesse, but even reproove them rather.

Imprinted 1623.

A

SHORT AND PLAINE DIALOGVE CONCERNING THE VNLAWfulnes of playing at Cards, or Tables, or any other Game consisting in chance.

OFFERED TO THE RELIGIous consideration of all such as make conscience of all their wayes.

1. Thessal. 5. 21.

Trie all things, and keepe that which is good.

Imprinted at London for *Richard Boile* 1593.

Reprinted 1623.

To the right Worshipfull Master *Lionel Maddison*, Maior, the Aldermen his Brethren, and the godly Burgesses of Newcastle vpon Tine; IAMES BALMFORD wisheth the kingdome of God & his righteousnesse that other things may be ministred vnto them.

THat which heretofore I haue propounded to you (right Worshipfull & beloued) in teaching, I doe now publish to all men by printing, to wit, mine opinion of the vnlawfulnes of Games consisting in chance. My desire is either information, if I erre in judgment, or reformation, of so leud a practise. But whether I erre or no (which yet I would gladly vnderstand, for I ought not to teach an vntruth, though to Gods glorie) yet there is none, zealous indeede against sin, desirous from the heart

Rom. 3. 7.

to

to reclaime sinners, and who deeply consi-
dereth the greiuous abuses, which accompanie
dicing and carding, (as horrible swearing,
dangerous quarelling, losse (I say not of
good houres, but) of nights and daies,
& the pitifull vndoeing of too too manny)
but will remember that all things are not 1.Cor.6.
expedient, which are lawfull, and therefore 12.
abstaine from such Heathenish *pastimes,*
that if by their example they cannot refor- 1.Cor.8
me, they may be sure they doe not confirme 9.
gamesters in their inordinate walking.
Which respect the 7. Iniunction forbidding
Ministers to vse these vnlawfull games,
may be supposed to haue. Now that which
authoritie exacteth of Ministers, doth Re-
ligion require of all true Professors. For
as the one are to be ensamples to the flocke, 1.Tit. 5.
so the other are to be lights in the world. 3. Phil. 2.
And therefore as Paul *saith, If meate of-* 5.
fend my brother, I will eate no flesh while 1.Cor.8
the world standeth: so euery true Christian 10.13.
should say, and that with more resolution
(for Play is not so necessarie as meate) If

play offend my brother, who seeing me hauing knowledge, play, is boldned to follow gaming, I will not play while the world standeth. Which care vnto edification, if all, who haue the word in their mouthes, and would not be thought to hate to be reformed, would manifest in their sincere conuersation; and if Magistrates, who should not carrie the sword in vaine, would doe what they may by law, to banish these forbidden past-times, *or rather* lost-times, *I doubt not, but that preaching and writing against thē would more mightily prevaile, and this good would come of it, many would applie themselues to better exercises, there would bee lesse time mispent in Alehouses, and Godlesse prouoked to displeasure against vs. But these things I referre to the consideration of the wise, and this my Dialogue to the iudgment of the godlie, chiefly to you, whose good I wish especially. Farewell: From my studie the first of Ianuarie 1593.*

Pſal. 50. 16. 17.

Rom. 13 4.

33. H. 8. c. 9. 5. E. 6. c. 25.

A

A ſhort and plaine Dialogue concerning the vnlawfulnes of playing at Cards or Tables, or any other game conſiſting of chance.

Profeſſor.

SIR, *howſoeuer I am perſwaded by that which I reade in the common places of* Peter Martyr, par. 2. pag. 525. b. *that Dice (condemned both by the Ciuill lawes, and by the Fathers) are therefore vnlawfull, becauſe they depend vpon chance: yet not ſatisfied with that which he writeth of Table-playing,* pag. 526. b. *I would craue your opinion concerning playing at Tables and Cards.*

Preacher. Sauing the iudgement of ſo excellent a Diuine, ſo farre as I can learne out of Gods word,

Cardes aud Tables ſeeme to mee no more lawfull (though leſſe offenſiue) than Dice. For Table-playing is no whit the more lawfull becauſe *Plato* compares the life of man thereunto, than a theefe is the more iuſtifiable , becauſe Chriſt compareth his ſecond comming, to *Burglarie* in the night, *Mat. 24. 43. 44.* Againe, if Dice be wholly euill, becauſe they wholly depend vpon chance, then Tables & Cards muſt needes be ſome what euill, becauſe they ſomewhat depend vpon chance. Therefore conſider well this reaſon, which condemneth the one as wel as the other : Lots are not to bee vſed in ſport ; but games conſiſting in chance as Dice, Cardes, Tables, are Lots: therefore not to be vſed in ſport.

Ioh. 8. 40. 1. Cor. 14. 15.

Prof. For my better inſtruction, proue that Lots are not to be vſed in ſport.

Preach. Conſider with regard theſe

theſe *three* things: *Firſt*, that wee reade not in the Scripture that Lots were vſed but only in ſerious matters both by the Iewes, *Ioſ. 18. 10.* and Gentiles, *Ion. 1. 7.* 1. *Secondly*, that a Lot in the nature therof doth as neceſſarily ſuppoſe the ſpecial prouidence & determining preſence of God, as an oath in the nature therof doth ſuppoſe the teſtifying preſence of God. Yea ſo, that (as in an oath, ſo) in a lot prayer is expreſſed, or to bee vnderſtood, *1. Sam. 14. 41.* 2. *Thirdly*, that the proper end of a Lot (as of an oath, *Heb. 6. 16.*) is to end a controverſie: and therefore for your better inſtruction examine theſe reaſons. Whatſoeuer directly, or of it ſelfe, or in a ſpeciall manner, tendeth to the advancing of the name of God, is to be vſed religiouſly, *Mal. 1. 6. 7.* and not to be vſed in ſport: as wee are not to pray 3. 1.

or ſweare in ſport, *Exod. 20. 7. Eſa. 29. 13. Ier. 4. 2.* but the vſe of Lots, directly of it ſelfe, and in a ſpeciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of the name of God, in attributing to his ſpeciall prouidence in the whole and immediate diſpoſing of the Lot, and expecting the euent, *Pro. 16. 33. Act. 1. 24. 26.* Therefore the vſe of Lots is not to be in

2. ſport. Againe, we are not to tempt the Almightie by a vaine deſire of manifeſtation of his power and ſpecia ll prouidence, *Pſal. 78. 18. 19. Eſa. 7. 12. Matth. 4. 6. 7.* But by vſing Lots in ſport we tempt the almightie, vainly deſiring the manifeſta- of his ſpeciall prouidence in his im-

3. mediate diſpoſing, Therfore, &c. Laſtly, whatſoeuer God hath ſanctified to a proper end, is not to bee peruerted to a worſe, *Matth. 21. 12. 13.* But God hath ſanctified Lots to a proper end, namely to end

con-

troverſies, *Num. 26. 55. Pro. 18. 18.* therefore man is not to peruert them to a worſe: namely to play, & by playing to get away another mans money, which without controuerſie is his owne. For the common ſaying is, *Sine lucro friget luſus*, No gaining, cold gaming.

Profeſ. God hath ſanctified Pſalmes to the praiſe of his name, & bread & wine to repreſent the bodie & bloud of our crucified Sauiour, which be holie ends: and the children of God may ſing Pſalmes to make themſelues merrie in the Lord, and feede vpon bread & wine not only for neceſſitie but to cheere themſelues; why then may not Gods children recreate themſelues by lotterie notwithſtanding God hath ſanctified the ſame to end a controuerſie?

Preach. Becauſe we finde not in the Scriptures any diſpenſation for recreation by lotterie, as wee doe for godlie mirth by ſinging, *Iam. 5. 13.* and for religious and ſo-

ber

ber cheering our ſelues by eating and drinking, *Deut. 8. 9. 10.* And therefore (it being withall conſidered that the ends you ſpeake of, be not proper, though holy) it followeth, that God who only diſpoſeth the Lot touching the euent, and is therefore a principall actor, is not to bee ſet on worke by lotterie in any caſe, but when hee diſpenſeth with vs, or giueth vs leaue ſo to doe: But diſpenſation for recreation by lotterie cannot be shewed, Therefore, &c.

Profeſ. Lots may be vſed for profit in a matter of right, Num. 26. 55. why not for pleaſure?

Preach. Then oathes may be vſed for pleaſure, for they may ſot profit, in a matter of truth, *Exod. 22. 8. 11.* But indeede lots (as oathes) are not to bee vſed either for profit or pleaſure, but onely to end a controuerſie.

Profeſ.

Profes. The wit is exercised by Tables and Cards, therefore they be no lots.

Preach. Yet lotterie is vsed by casting Dice, and by shuffling and cutting the Cards before the wit is exercised. But how doth this follow? Because Cards and Tables bee not naked Lots, consisting only in chance (as Dice doe) they are therefore no lots at all. Although (being vsed without cogging, or packing) they consist principally in chance, and therefore from thence they are to receiue their denomination. In which respect a Lot is called in Latin *Sors*, that is, chance or hazard, and *Lyra* vpon *Prou. 16.* saith, To vse Lots, is, by a variable euent of some sensible thing, to determine some doubtfull or vncertaine matter, as to draw cutts, or to cast Dice.

But whether you will call Cards and

and Tables Lots, or no, you play with chance or vſe Lotterie. Then conſider whether exerciſe of wit doth ſanctifie playing with lotterie, or playing with lotterie make ſuch excerciſing of wit, a ſinne. *Hag. 2. 13. 14.* For as a calling God to witnes by vaine ſwearing is a ſinne, *2. Cor. 1. 13.* ſo making God an vmpire, by playing with lotterie, muſt needs be a ſinne: yea, ſuch a ſin as maketh the offender (in ſome reſpects) more blame-worthy. For there be more occaſions of ſwearing than of lotterie. *Secondly*, vaine oathes moſt commonly ſlip out at vnawares, whereas lots cannot be vſed but with deliberation. *Thirdly*, ſwearing is to ſatiſfie other, wheras this kind of lotterie is altogether to fulfill our own luſt. Therefore take heede, that you bee not guiltie of peruerting the ordinance of the Lord, of taking

ing the name of God in vaine, and
f tempting the Almightie, by a
ameſome putting of things to ha-
ard, and making play of lotterie,
xcept you thinke that God hath
o gouvernment in vaine actions,
r hath diſpenſed with ſuch lewd
ames.

Profeſ. Inſhooting there is a chance,
a ſudden blaſt, yet ſhooting is no lot-
erie.

Preach. It is true, for that chance
ommeth by accident, and not of
he nature of the game, to be
ſed.

Profeſ. Lots are ſecret, and the whole
diſpoſing of them is of God, Pro 16. 33.
ut it is otherwiſe in Tables and Cards.

Preach. Lots are caſt into the
ap by man, and that openly, leſt
conveiance ſhould be ſuſpected:
ut the diſpoſing of the chance is
ecret, that it may be chance in-
eede, and wholly of God, who di-
recteth

recteth all things, *Prou. 16. 13. 9. 33.* So in Tables, man by faire castin Dice truly made, and in Carde by shuffling and cutting, doth o penly dispose the Dice and Card so, as whereby a variable euen may follow: but it is onely and im mediatly of God, that the Dice be so cast, and the Cards so shuffle and cut, as that this or that gam followeth, except there be coggin and packing. So that in faire pla mans wit is not exercised in dispo sing the chance, but in making the best of it being past.

Profes. The end of our play is recrea tion, and not to make God an vmpire: bu recreation (no doubt) is lawfull.

Preach. It may be the souldier had no such end when they cas lots for Christ his coate, *Matth. 27. 25.* but this should be your end when you vse lotterie, as the end of an oath should be, to call God

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to witneſſe. Therefore as ſwearing, ſo Lotterie, without due reſpect is ſinne. Againe, howſoever recreation be your pretended end, yet remember that wee muſt not doe euill that good may come of it, *Rom. 3. 8.* And that therefore wee are to recreate our ſelues by lawfull recreations. Then ſee how Cardes and Tables be lawfull.

Profeſ. If they be not abuſed by ſwearing or brawling, playing for too long time, or too much money.

Preach. Though I am perſwaded that it is not lawfull to play for any money, conſidering thankes cannot be giuen in faith for that which is ſo gotten, *Deut. 23. 18. Eſa. 61. 8.* Gameſters worke not with their hands the thing that good, to be free frō ſtealing, *Eph. 4. 18.* & the looſer hath not anſwerable benefit for his money ſo loſt, *Gen. 29. 15.* con-

trarie to that equitie which *Aristotle* by the light of nature hath taught long since, *Eth. 5. c. 4.* yet I grant that Cards and Tables so vsed as you speake are, lesse sinfull, but how they bee lawfull I see not yet.

Profes. Good men and well learned vse them.

Preach. Wee must liue by precepts, not by examples, except they be vndoubtedly good. Therefore examine whether they be good, and well learned in so doing or no. For euery man may erre, *Rom. 3. 4.*

Profes. It is not good to be too just, or too wise, Eccl. 7. 18.

Preach. It is not good to be too wicked or too foolish, *Eccl. 7. 19.* in despising the word of God, *Prou. 1. 22.* and not regarding the weakenesse of others, *Rom. 14. 21.* Let vs therefore beware that

that we loue not pleasure
more than godlinesse,
2. Tim. 3. 4.

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Christian Reader; it is no new thing that men, learned, wise, and judicious, holding the same orthodox, and sound truth of God, in respect of maine, and fundamentall points of *Christian Religion*, doe sometimes differ in their opinions, and be of different judgments touching some things of lesse importance. It pleaseth God (who ordereth all things most wisely for the spirituall good of his owne) by his wise disposing hand to order differences in opinion, and judgment in the *smallest* matters for the further good of his *Church*. Though the iarring of *Paul*, and *Barnabas* (*Act.* 15. 37.) caused a separation of the one from the other, yet (God so disposing)

the Church gott much good by it
and things queſtioned, and contro-
verted (though of leſſer weight
are commonly more narrowly ſe
arched into, and vpon diligen
ſearch into them, they come to be
better cleared, and the gifts o
worthy men to be better knowne
It were no hard matter to inſtance
in many particulars clearing thi
from many ages fore-going; but I
liſt not to enter into that large
field. The enſuing Reply conſide-
red with the occaſion of it, may, in
part, evidence, the truth herein
Some yeares ſince, the *Authour* o
this Reply, published a *Dialogue*
touching Lottery, and Lotts, diſ-
prooving, (by diverſe arguments,
the vſing of Lotts in ſport, and in
play; and now ſome few yeares
paſt finding his arguments oppo-
ſed, and helde as weake, and inſuf-
ficient, by a worthy, reverend, and
judi-

judicious *Divine*, in a treatiſe of his printed touching the Nature, and vſe of Lotts, he held himſelfe bound, vpon further, and more ſerious conſideration of the point called into queſtion, either to alter his judgment, or to endeavour, to ſtrengthen his former arguments: He hath ſett vpon the buiſineſſe, and now offered to thy view (*Chriſtian Reader*) his Reply tending to the further ſtrengthning, and confirmation of thoſe arguments. My poore judgment touching this Reply being deſired by the *Authour*, I could not but yeeld it vnto him, he being my reverend, and loving freind, to whom I am obliged by many bondes of love. I have peruſed it, & ſo farre as I, (in my weakneſſe) can judge, the *Authour* hath herein carried himſelfe wiſely, and judiciouſly, and ſo as, I thinke, may ſatisfie any indifferent reader, and

with all (as I take it) modeſtly, and temperately, and without the leaſt breach of charity towards the worthy *Opponent*. Happily I may be thought vnfitt thus to giue mine opinion, becauſe (as I freely confeſſe, & have openly made knowne) I iumpe with this *Authour* in iudgment in the point controverted, but I profeſſe before him, who knowes the hearts of all men, that, which here I putt downe, is (as I conceive) according to the truth, without any inclining, or partiall affection to the one one ſide, or to the other, and I deſire not to entertaine the leaſt thought, that may præiudice the worth of the reverend, learned, and godly *Opponent*, being alſoo my deare, and loving freind, and one whom I am bound, in many reſpects, both to love, and reverence. Looke vpon this Reply (whoſoever thou art) with an

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vnpartialleye, and consider it seriously, and finding that good by it, which is intended, blesse God for it, who guideth, and blesseth all things to his owne glory, and to the good of his owne.

Thine in the Lord Iesus
Edw: Elton. *B. in D.*
and Pastor of S. Mary
Magdalen's Bermondsey neare London.

To the Christian Reader

being none of those men, who, (according to S. Paul's *prophecy,) love pleasures more than God.*

2. Tim. 3.4.

Some yeares are past since *Mr. Gataker* tooke occasion, from casting of Lotts to finde out for whose sake a daungerous storme was, to justifie playing with Dice, Cards, &c. and to confute me *by name* in open pulpit. I hearing thereof by many, sent him this message. If it would please him to send the substance of the Confutation (for I dare not rely vpon report) I would either reply, or chaunge mine opinion with

Ionah. 1.7.

with thankes to God for him; though for the preſent, I thought he failed in Indgment, Diſcretion, and Charity. In *Iudgment*. Becauſe that Doctrine was not drawne from his Text; Except this be a judicious deduction. Gentiles caſt Lotts in a moſt ſerious matter, therefore Chriſtians may vſe Lottery in dicing, carding, &c. In *Diſcretion*. Becauſe that Doctrine (though occaſioned by his text, yet) ſo inſiſted vpon, incourageth gameſters in their ſinfull courſe and buildeth vp thoſe abuſes, which the Lawes of our Land, would pull downe. In *Charity*; Becauſe he confuteth me *by name*, (as I was certified) not having had any conference with me either by ſpeech, or by writing, though I be his neighbour Miniſter. Well; *Mr. Gataker*, ſent me his anſwere to my dialogue. I acknowledge it with hearty thankes.

kes. But why have I not replyed in ſo many yeares? I anſwere, *Sa citò, ſi ſat benè.* To ſpeake freely I thinke, I ſhould never have replied, in hope that the queſtion would have died, had not *Mr. Gataker* confuted my Dialogue in print. But now, the rather, being provoked, by many learned Miniſters & other, who tell me, that, ſeeing of all thoſe whom *Mr. Gataker* confuteth, viz: *Peter Martyr, Zuinglius, Cartwright, Danæus, Perkins, Fenner, &c.* I onely live, I ought to reply, leaſt my ſilence ſhould give way to impious iniquity, I am ready to performe my promiſe in replying. Which (indeed) I could not have done ſo conveniently before, becauſe the anſwer, which *Mr. Gataker* ſent me, had not the poſitiue groundes of his opinion, which the printed booke hath.

Before I proceed, I proteſt before

fore God, that I esteeme *Mr. Gataker* as a learned, painfull, and faithfull Minister, and a right honest man, and therefore pray thee (*Christian Reader*) that whatsoever I write may be considered as concerning the question betweene vs, and not in any wise applied to the least præjudice of so reverend a brother, or to any of his excellent parts; So excellent, that I wonder what mooved him to publish his opinion in print, and the more, because of many passages in his booke. *First*, He taketh knowledge of many enormous crimes, which accompany Dice, Cardes, &c. *pa. 193.* & in the quotations. *Secondly*; He giveth this rule, That, that, which is no necessary duety, but a thing indifferēt onely, otherwise, may not be done, where is strōg presumptiō vpō good ground that 1. 2.

yet it shall ſpiritually endanger a mans ſelfe, or others, by giving occaſion of ſinne vnto the one, or the other. *pag. 107. 108. 109.*

If many and greivous ſinnes attend dice, cardes, &c. If thoſe games be too too commonly abuſed, as he confeſſeth. *pa: 194.* and if an indifferent thing may not be done which giveth occaſion of ſinne, I wonder why *Mr. Gataker* writeth in defence of dice, &c. and the more, becauſe he graunteth, that, where the vſe, and abuſe of a thing are ſo inwrapped, and intangled togither, that they cannot eaſily be ſevered the one from the other, then the vſe of the thing it ſelfe, (if it be vnneceſſary otherwiſe) would be wholely abandoned, *pag. 262. 263. Thirdly*; He sheweth in many pages, how *ſeverely* tables, bnt eſpecially dice, be condemned by Lawes, *Civill*, *Canonicall*, and *Municipall*,

ipall, that is, our *English* statutes, as he sheweth at large, *Lib. 8. § 5. 8.* He wisheth the Lawes were yet more severe, & putt in better execution, *pa. 206.* He saith, yet our common dicers may be marshalled among ye flock, of ye Devill's followers, *pa. 217.* He affirmeth most Rifelings, and Lotteries to be little better than vnlawfull games, *pag. 120.* And he teacheth, that, by theis games, we must not give offence to the Lawes vnder which wee live, *pa. 251.* Now I wonder, that so good a man is not affraid to offend our Law by allowing forbidden games, even Dice, as well as Cardes, &c. which consist not onely of Lottery. Here I have occasion to thinke, that I may have some more comfort in mine opinion, than *Mr. Gataker* can have in his; For he nameth famous, learned, and godly men concurring

with

with me in opinion : But in th
multitude of his quotations, I find
none approoving Dice in play, an
whereas some learned Divines, i
some sort, allow games consistin
of Lott, and witt, but altogethe
condemne Dice, *Mr. Gataker* defen
deth mine opinion, disapproovin
a *mixt*, as well as a *mere* Lott, be
cause (as he saith) a true Lott is i
either, *pa. 126.* and, He deemet
them to be amisse, who allow Lott
in game, and yet adde for a cautio
that Religionsnesse be vsed in th
action, in regard that Holy thing
must be done in an holy manner
4. *pa. 133. Fourthly*, He graunteth tha
Prayer specially applied to the
Lott may be conceived, where the
matter is more weighty, and the
event of some consequence, *pa. 91*
And yet he holdeth, that the lesse
weighty the matter is, wherein a
Lott is vsed, the lawfuller the Lott

is, pag.
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is, *pag.* 111. The reaſon, why I wonder at this paſſage, ſhall be given in my Reply. The laſt paſſage now to be obſerved as matter of my wondering, is this; Notwithſtanding, he confidently affirmeth that we may not doe ought without warrant, *pag.* 301. Sufficiently confirmeth the ſame, becauſe ſuch an Act is not done of Faith, and therefore not free from ſinne, *Rom.* 14. 23. but is a mere preſumption, and tempting of God, *pag.* 313. and *quot. A.* and *B.* and Earneſtly reprooveth one kinde of Lottery (why not all, againſt which the ſame reaſon is of like validity?) becauſe not found revealed in any word of God, but brought in either by Sathan, or by ſome of his inſtruments who are addicted to Vanity, *pag.* 315. and 316. and, yet he avoucheth, That it is a ſufficient warrant for the vſe of Lottes,

In that the oppugners, being learned, can say nothing against them, but what hath beene, or may be sufficiently answered, *pag.* 235.

May I not wonder that so judicious a scholler doth not observe this discrepance? Lottery is vnlawfull, if not warranted by the word, which positiõ suppoſeth the Word to be perfect, as is the Authour thereof, and 2. Lottery is lawfull if Learned men can say nothing out of the Word against it. Which position suppoſeth *two things*, viz. That the Word is like the Lawes of men, that is, Imperfect, as be the Authours therof; and, That Learned men cannot so faile in Diligence of reading, Cleareneſſe of vnderſtanding, and Firmeneſſe of Memory but that, if there were in the Word anything against Lottery, they could nor but see it. Well; It may be seene shortly, how *Mr. Gataker*

Dili-

gence, Vnderſtanding, and Memory have ſerved him in defending Luſorious Lotts. In the meane while, *Sufficiency* of his anſwering is but vpon the Triall, and not yet adjudged.

All theis paſſages well reveiwed by *Mr. Gataker* I should thinke he cannot wonder that a man of 64. *yeares compleate*, (and therefore his wittes may faile) doth wonder that ſo godly, wiſe, and learned a man, the faculties of whoſe minde are at the beſt, did not ſay to himſelfe, before he preached, much more before he penned this luſorious doctrine, Let Baal plead for himſelfe; and, Theis gameſters ſhall, without any encouragment from me, draw on their iniquity with theis cordes of vanity; and the rather, becauſe he acknowledgeth that accoumpt is to be given vnto God of gaming *pa. 261.* If of the act

Iudg. 6. 31. 32. Eſa. 5. 18

much more of justifying it. From which account good Lord deliver me. For I feare, that in iustifying luſorious Lottes, I should put falſe ſpectacles on a gameſter's noſe, whereby the bridge ſeemeth broader, than it is, and ſo he falleth in without feare, to vſe *Mr. Gataker* ſimilitude, *pag. 264.* But *Mr. Gataker* beleveth, that he hath written the truth, (Preface to the Reader) and is confident that truth is to be knowne, eſpecially concerning matters of common practiſe, *pag. 263.* and giveth *foure* reaſons, by which he was mooved to defend luſorious Lottes, *pag. 264.* The *firſt* is, To draw men from Superſtition in reſtraining themſelves, when God doth not reſtraine them. This beggeth the queſtion, (as I hope) will appeare in the Reply. 1.

A 2. motive is, Becauſe arguments againſt luſorious Lottes have made 2.

many

many ſtagger in the neceſſary vſe of ſerious civill Lottes. It may be ſo ſome failing in their judgment: But it may be alſo, that many moe will be made to ſtagger by reading *Mr. Gatakers* exceptions againſt arguments for, and cautions, in thoſe ſerious Civill Lottes, *Cap. 5.* and by his *Maxime*, [The leſſe weighty the matter is, wherein a Lott is vſed, the lawfuller the Lott is, *pag. 111.*] A 3. motive is, To take away much heart-burning; Nay, rather this juſtifying Luſorious Lottes will not onely cauſe more heart-burning; but incourage alſo gameſters to overcrow ſuch, as are ſcrupulous. For, if many well affected have beene conſtrained, in regard of ſcruple, in this kinde, to ſtraine themſelves to ſome inconveniences by refuſall of thoſe games, when by thoſe, whom they had dependance vpon,

vpon or familiarity withall, they have beene vrged occaſionally therevnto (which to prevent hereafter, is a 4. cauſe of his writing) How will thoſe ſupporters, and familiars inſult vpon the ſcrupulous, now they have ſo learned a *Patrone* of their gaming? Some have ſtrained themſelves, to ſome inconveniences for not pledging drunken *Healths*, being drinke offerings to *Bacchus*. To prevent which hereafter, should *Mr. Gataker* doe well, vnto ædification, to preach, and write in Iuſtification of theſe *Healths*? The ſumme of his cauſes (as he expreſſeth himſelfe in his preface to the Reader) is, To ſett at Liberty the intangled conſciences of Godly diſpoſed perſons. Indeed; If any conſcience, ſimply for playing with Lottes, should ſeeke his his ſatisfaction in private, then if *Mr. Gataker* quie-

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ted him by his grounds (ſuppoſed true) it were not amiſſe. But is every doctrine, though true, to be inſiſted vpon both by preaching, and printing, and that affirming matter in queſtion, and of no neceſſary vſe? I ſay, *Affirming*, remembring the holy wiſedome of the *Apoſtles*, and *Elders*, who decreed touching offenſive things (yet ſome of them lawfull, if conveniently vſed) onely *negatively*, and deemeth it not neceſſary to decree affirmatively things that were then, and might be in vſe for a time. Many (I feare too many) learned Divines approove Vſury in their Iudgment, thouh condemned by Law. Yet none, that I know, ever inſiſted vpon the Iuſtification thereof by preaching and printing. Againe; Was there ever any ſo troubled with playing with Lotts? I doubt it; But without doubt thouſandes will now more

Act. 15. 28. 29.

boldly vſe luſorious Lotts without regard of the cautions, in theis licentious times. As Vſurers regard not the cautions which Divines ſett downe. For it is enough to them, that ſome godly Divines affirme Vſury to be lawfull. O that *Mr. Gataker* had conſidered what he writeth, *pag. 107.* before cited, and what he writeth, *pag. 103.* and *104.* viz: Where inconveniences, that ſhall neceſſarily, or in good probability, appeare to accompany the thing queſtioned, or enſue vpon the doing thereof, ſhall be ſuch, and ſo great as the Conveniences, which ſtand on the other ſide, ſhall not be able to countervaile, there that action is worthily diſallowed as Inconvenient, and a Lott conſequently vnlawfull, what he writeth in his ſpirituall Watch *pag. 27.* viz: The riſer any evill i in thoſe places, or ages we live i

the

the more carefull should we be to shunne, and avoide such a sinne. No doubt he would have taken heede how by writing he make way to the sinne of, or by, Lusorious Lotts. Many Divines and intelligent men, though of opinion that Lusorious mixed Lotts may be vsed lawfully, yet wish that *Mr. Gataker* had never published his booke. For a running horse (say they) needeth no spurring. For my part I wish, that *Mr. Gataker* had beene affected in writing, as he professeth himselfe to be in the vse of lusorious Lottes, *pag. 266.* Wel; Whatsoever he writeth *dogmatically*, he wisheth thee (good Reader) to imitate him in his practise, to witt, That, albeit in judgment thou art rightly informed of the truth concerning the lawfulnesse of theis games in themselves; yet in godly discretion,

thou wouldſt rather abandõ them, conſidering the too too common, and ordinary abuſe of them, and that many (it may be) among whom thou liveſt may remaine vnreſolved, and vnſatisfied, touching the lawfulnes of them, *pag. 267.* I deſire the ſame, and therewith a ſuſpending thy judgment vntill thou haſt well conſidered my *Dialogue*, *Mr. Gatakers* anſweres, and my *Reply*, together with mine anſwere to his poſitive groundes. Here I promiſe (with *Mr. Gataker*, *pag. 128.*) to raze what I have reared, if my *Reply* and aunſweres be prooved inſufficient, and ſo commend thee to God, and to the Word of his Grace, which is able to build further. Onely, conſider what I ſay, and the Lord give thee vnderſtanding in all things.

Act. 20. 32. 2. Tim. 2. 7.

14. *Septemb.* 1620.

To

To the Reader.

THat I *may doe* Mr. Gataker *no wrong I am to lett thee know that the* 14. of March. 1622. Stil: Ang. Mr. Gataker *denied* naming *me when he confuted mine arguments in Pulpit, yet confessing that he named me in Pulpit, with others, diversely dissenting from him in judgment touching Lusorious Lotts when he entred into the question of playing with Lotts.*

An Answere to Reasons inducing M. Gataker *to allow lusorious Lottes, as not evill in themselves, Lib. 6. § 4.*

THIS Tenent seemeth to me more fearefull, then beseemeth a learned man, who, after the turning over a wonderfull number of bookes to compile his Historicall, and Theologicall Treatise of the Nature, and Vse of Lotres, setteth downe his judgment. Allowing lusorious Lottes *onely as not evill in themselves*, whereas he affirmeth them to be *lawfull in themselves, pag. 266.* So that if theis games be vsed with due

due obſervation of all his cautions, why is he fearefull to allow them *as good in themſelves*? How then may a ſcrupulous man, who remembreth not onely his wicked wicked wayes, but his deedes alſo that are not good, build vpon ſuch *quagmiry* grounds? Againe; Allowing theis games onely as not evill in themſelves doth not manifeſt that Love of God, which (I doubt not) is in *Mr. Gatakers* heart. For whereas God is glorified by good workes, and theis games be too too common, and accompanied with many crying ſinnes, whereby God is every where, and dayly much diſhonoured, the Love of God would have conſtrained him, if doing truth, to haue brought theis games to the light, that thereby it might be made manifeſt, that they are wrought according to God. *Laſtly*; By this Tenent he sheweth not

Ezek. 36. 31.

Math. 5. 16.

Iohn. 3. 21.

not due Charity to his neighbour. For now it is enoug for Gamesters to pleade; *A very learned man holdeth our Gaming to be not evill in it selfe.* Therefore they will not seeke, further to know, whither it be good in it selfe, forgetting that it is writen. Math. 3. 10. [The axe is putt to the roote of the trees, therefore every tree which bringeth not forth *good fruite*, is hewen downe, and cast into the fire.] Is not then hereby his neighbour's spirituall daunger occasioned? But here (perhappes) it may be said, The first Reason, prooving that a Lott may be matter of Recreation, doth give me a checke: It is a *checke*? Then I will try if I cannot avoide the *Mate*. The Argument, collected with all faithfulnes, (as the rest, and his aunsweres be,) is this.

M.G. 1. That which may be ordinarily vsed in other Civill affaires, be they

more

more or leſſe weighty, may alſo be vſed for matter of recreation, and delight: But a Lott may be ordinarily vſed in other Civill affaires. Therefore I ſee not what should banish it out of our diſportes, more than out of other (though ſerious yet) Civill affaires.

Is not this a fearefull concluſion like the Tenent? Why doth not *Mr. Gataker* conclude poſitively thus. Therefore a Lott may be vſed for matter of recreation, and delighte. He (forſooth) ſee's not. Can a blinde man goe ſtoutly on his way? But (bleſſed be God) *Mr. Gataker* ſeeth well, though not in this point. *Bernardus non vidit omnia.* For, if God had opened his eyes in this point, he might have ſeene plainely what should banish a Lott out of diſportes, more than out of other Civill affaires. To witt, Becauſe God alloweth a Lott to be vſed *I. B. 1.*

ſed in *them*, but not in *theis*; and It is præſumption, of ſett purpoſe, to imploy God but as it may ſtand with his pleaſure. Hereof more hereafter. In meane while, in further aunſwer to this argument I deny the Propoſition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily vſed in other Civill matters, yet not for matter of Recreation: Whereof alſo more hereafter. Now I proceed to the 2. reaſon, which is ſett downe in twoo shapes; The former is this.

M.G.2. That which beſt ſorteth with the nature of a Lott, may a Lott moſt lawfully be vſed vnto: But the lighteſt matters beſt ſort with the nature of a Lott: Therefore about things of that nature may a Lott moſt lawfully be vſed. The Propoſition he prooveth thus. Great is the vncertainty of a Lott. Therefore not fitt to be vſed in any weighty

weighty affaire.

A Lott is ſometimes taken for the inſtrument of purpoſe diſpoſed vnto caſualty, as [*The Lott is caſt into the lappe:*] and ſometime for the event, as, [Give a perfect Lott] Which, howſoever it be caſuall in relation to the former, yet, falleth out certainely this, or that, by God's whole diſpoſing the former, *Prov. 16. 33.* I therefore deny both the Propoſition, and Aſſumption perſwaded that *Mr. Gataker* would never have ſett downe this ſuppoſed reaſon, if a Lott, in the former acception, had not drawne his religious eye from God as the onely diſpoſer thereof to be a Lott in the latter acception. So that I mervaile much, that he findeth a Lott to be not fitt to be vſed in any weighty affaire. For why? *Dividing the Land of promiſe, Numb. 26. 55.* by Lott.

I. B. 2.

Prou. 16 33.

1. Sam. 14. 41.

Discovering Achan. Iohs. 14. Chusing of a king. 1. Sam. 10. 20. 21. and of an Apostle Acts: 1. 26. were they not weighty affaires? Nay rather the premisses considered, a Lott may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires. But indeed, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, a Lott may be vsed about it, provided it be with Gods allowance. For want whereof both Divinatory, and Lusorious Lotts be equally vnlawfull. The other shape of his reason, more particularly (as he saith) for the present buisinesse is this.

M. G. A matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully doe, or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe, or omitt, such may a man lawfully putt to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature, whether he shall doe it, or not doe it: But the vsing of

a Lott

a Lott in game is but the putting of a mattet of mere indifferency to the hazard of an vncertaine event. Therefore the putting of ſuch matters to the hazard of a Lott, is not evill ſimply in it ſelfe.

What a trembling argument is this? In the Propoſition he ſpeaketh of a Lott in the former acception. In the Aſſumption, of a Lott in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, ſo it be without relation to God, than with the Creatour himſelfe. In the Propoſition he affirmeth lawfullnes but concludeth onely, as not evill ſimply in themſelves. Indeed, the concluſion is to follow the worſe part: But in this Argument the Aſſumption is particular, and the Concluſion is generall. What? Is *Mr. Gataker* afraid to put (The vſing of a Lott in game) into the concluſion? is not *I. B.*

the *Minor* to be the *Subiect*, and the *Maior* to be the *Prædicate* of the Concluſion? I will not quæſtion the *Figure* of this prætended argument if *Sub: præ: prima:* will ſerve the turne; and though I finde it in no *Moode*, yet will I anſwer the two fore-pieces thereof. The former is not true, except *Mr. Gataker* vnderſtand a matter of mere indifferency controverted. For though ſuch a matter may be the ſubiect matter of a Controverſy, yet a matter controverted is the onely ſubiect matter of a Lott, otherwiſe it is no Lott, as *Mr. Gataker* truely writeth even in this caſe, *pag. 167.* If *Mr. Gataker* ſo vnderſtand, then there is ſome neceſſity of ending the controyerſy putt to the determination of a Lott, and conſequently it is not then merely in the will of a man whether he ſhall doe it, or no doe it. In the other piece I obſerve,

ve, that *Mr. Gataker* ſpeaking of a Lot in the ſecond acception, ſuppoſeth it to be vncertaine. Which is begging the queſtion, for the reaſon given in mine aunſwere to his former shaped argument. Neither it is true that if in game, a controverſy (*truly ſo termed*) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of mere indifferency is put to hazard. But more hereof in my 3. reply. In meane while, conſider whether this 2. shape be more particularly for the preſent buſineſſe, ſo as to conclude the queſtion, than the former; and Note. that in both theis shapes, onely Lightnes, and indifferency of matters putt to Lottery are preſſed as cauſes moſt iuſtifying a Lot, yea ſo, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped arguments propoſition, he poſitively affirmeth that we shall finde a Lott not fitt to be vſed in a weighty af-

faire. If ſo, then Weightneſſe, and Neceſſity of matters controverted make Lottery leſſe lawfull, if not altogether vnlawfull. But thereof alſo more in that reply. I therefore proceed to his 3. reaſon *pag. 131.* Which is this.

M. G. 3. If the vſe of Lotts in game be of it ſelfe evill, then muſt it needs be a ſinne either againſt *Piety* in the firſt table, or ag: *Charity* in the 2. But the vſe of Lottes in game, is not of it ſelfe, a ſinne againſt either *Piety*, or *Charity*. Therefore it muſt be iuſtified as agreeable to Gods Word. The Aſſumption is prooved thus No man avoweth the vſe of a Lot in game, (as it is a Lott) to be againſt *Charity*: and A Luſorious Lot is not the prophaning of any thing hallowed, by any divine inſtitution from the Word, to an holy Vſe. Therefore not againſt *Piety*. Indeed, if Lottes be holy, they may

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in no caſe be made matter of ſport.

Here I obſerve one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the 2. reaſon *to witt*. The concluſion conteineth more than the premiſſes. For the Concluſion ſaith A Lot in game is agreeable to Gods Word, and then it muſt be [*Good of it ſelfe*,] which is more, than [*Not evill of it ſelfe.*] For that is good of it ſelfe, for doing whereof there is either præcept, or permiſſion in Gods word, *pag.* 137. But to the Aſſumption, and prooſe thereof I anſwere, That the vſe of a Lott in game is, (of it ſelfe), a ſinne againſt *Piety*. For it profaneth a Lot hallowed by divine inſtitution from the Word, as ſhall be manifeſted hereafter. Yet here I thinke fitt breifely to ſhew *2. things*. *One is*, That an Oath is hallowed to make an holy vſe of the *teſtifying* preſence *I. B. 3.* 1.

of God, So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy vſe of the *determining* preſence of God. If *Mr. Gataker* deny a Lott to be holy, except it have a more remote holy vſe, I ſay He may as well deny an Oath to be holy for that cauſe. More of this point in my 2. reply. *The other is,* That vſe of a Lott is againſt Piety, which is (I ſay not, [*Not forbidden*] but) [*Not warranted*] by the Word. For it is without faith, therefore a ſinne, yea Impiety. So diſputeth *Mr. Gataker* againſt a Divinatory Lott, *pag. 313.* and ſo doe I againſt a Luſorions Lot. If then a lawfull Lott be holy, it is (ſaith *Mr. Gataker*) in no caſe to be made matter of ſport. Nay, I may make yet more advantage. For I may ſay; That maintaining the vſe thereof in gaming, as it is a Lott, by practiſe, much more by writing, is againſt *Charity*, as well as againſt *Piety*. For

2.

Rom. 14 23.

so [*a weake brother is offended, and consequently Christ sinned against*] that brother being occasioned, by errour of iudgment, to stumble. I have this reasoning from *Mr. Gataker* himselfe, *pag. 255.* Now then with some comfort I proceed to the 4. argument, as *Mr. Gataker* calleth it, *pag. 134.*

By vertue of *Christian liberty*, every Christian man hath a free vse of all Gods good creatures, to imploy them vnto such purposes, as by any naturall power, they are inabled vnto: But in lusorious Lottes the Creature is vsed to no other ende or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto, and such as by the mutuall consent, and agreement of those that vse it, it may be enabled to effect. Therefore it's no more to be exiled from a Christian man's recratiõ, than any other creature whatsoever, that hath any *M.G. 4.*

power to delight.

I. B. 4. So generall & eager is the pur-
ſuite after Liberty in this licen-
tious age, that a godly, and charita-
ble Chriſtian, (much more being a
miniſter), ought to take great
heede, that he occaſion not any
much leſſe too too many, to make
1. Pet. 2. 16. Liberty a cloake of *Naughtineſſe*.
But *Mr. Gataker* ſpeaketh of Chriſ-
tian liberty, not of *Licentiouſneſſe*.
Then let vs conſider what he ſaith.
For both the premiſſes of this ar-
gument are flatly to be denied.
For ſundry good Creatures have a
naturall power to impoiſon; But
Chriſtian Liberty giveth vs not
free vſe thereof to impoiſon at
pleaſure. Neither is it true that
any creature hath a naturall power
to be a Lott, no more than a ſtone
hath a naturall power to be carried
vpward. For as a ſtone is carried
vpward by a power, that is without

it: ſo all creatures are mooved, & applied to be Lotts by a power without them. God keepe me from teaching that Chriſtian Liberty warranteth the vnlawfull vſe of any Creature, what naturall power ſoever it hath to that vſe. If any creature have any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be vſed vnto Lottery, but in caſes (whereof gameing is none) wherein God alloweth ſuch vſe thereof. To the inforcing of the concluſion by a ſuppoſed confirmation of the Aſſumption, I ſay, It is a begging of the queſtion. For though a dog having a naturall power to hunt, be not exiled from recreatiō yet ought a *Lot-creature* to be, for reaſons given, and to be given, or rather defended hereafter. Now then to a 5. argument *A conceſſis*, (as *Mr. Gataker* tearmeth it,) *pag.* 135.

Anything

M.G.5. Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing indifferent; Lottery therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport. The Proposition is confirmed by the wordes of *M. Fennor*. *Christian* (saith he) *recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessary refreshing of body, or minde.* The Assumption is also proved by *Mr. Fennor*. Indifferent in nature is that, which is left free, so as we are not simply commaunded, or forbidden to vse it: But such is Lottery (saith *Mr. Gataker*) Not simply commaunded. For *Prov. 18.18.* is rather a *permission* than a *præcept*, or, Not so much a *Commaundement* as an advise commending that as a prudent course; Nor any where forbidden as evill in it selfe.

I.B. 5. *Mr. Fennor's* booke, from whence theis allegations be drawne, and from whence I learned that

Lottes

Lottes may not be vſed in ſport, doth proove that luſorious Lottes are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What helpe then hath *Mr. Gataker* from *Mr. Fennors* grauntes? and his owne prooſes helpe him as little. For it is graunted, that if Lottery be either commaunded, or forbidden, it is not indifferent, to paſſe by the former, onely obſerving that *Mr. Gataker* doth not abſolutely deny it to be commaunded, *Prov. 18. 18.* I come to the other. I might here referre the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will appeare evidently, that a Luſorious Lott is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. But to ſpeake a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, becauſe forbidden, I ſay, That is forbidden as well which is forbiddō by iuſt cōſequence, as that

which

which is expreſly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by iuſt conſequence as that which is expreſſely permitted. *Mr. Gataker* affirmeth, the latter, *pa. 137.* and will not (I dare ſay) deny the former. Againe, The Word of God is ſo perfect, that whatſoever it neither commaundeth, nor permitteth expreſſely, or by iuſt conſequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, eſpecially ſuch as have relation to God, ought to have ſome warrant from the word. If *Mr. Gataker* putt me to proove this, I dare vndertake to proove it demonſtratively. But I preſume he will not. For, in the laſt mentioned *page*, he deſcribeth that to be indifferent, which is (*at leaſt*) permitted by the Word. If a thing be not ſo much as permitted, it cannot be lawfull, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would

remem-

remember, what he writeth *pag. 95.* Speaking of this word [*Indifferent,*] s it is oppoſed to good, or evill, & hewing how ſome ſay, that to be ndifferent which is neither good, or evill, he determineth the point hus. *Neverthelesse most true it is, That o particular morall action, or No action f the reaſonable Creature proceeding rom reaſon, can poſſibly be ſo indifferent, ut it muſt of neceſſity be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy Word, or iſconformable thereunto.* So that I onder, why *Mr. G.* should ſay ere, Lottery in game is not any here forbidden as evill in it ſelfe. s it not evill, if forbidden, except be otherwiſe evill of it ſelfe? hat is good of it ſelfe which is ither commaunded, or permitted, *ag, 137.* Therefore that is evill of ſelfe which is forbidden. It grei-eth my ſoule to ſee what a wide ore to luſorious Lottery this doctrine

doctrine will make. For now *Lot-mongers* will choppe Logicke, and say, What if a luforious Lotte be forbidden by iuſt conſequence, yet they are not forbidden as evill in themſelves, and therefore they are indifferent. Now to come to *Mr. Gatakers* laſt reaſon, which, like an *Oratour*, he amplifieth to leave a deepe impreſſion behinde. But let it be well conſidered, as in itſelfe, ſo whether it proove that the vſe of Lottes in game is not againſt Gods worde, but hath ſufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, *pag. 136.* It is this.

M.G. 6. Where the Wiſdome of God, hath not determined the ſubiect matter, the manner, and other Circumſtances of a thing lawfull in itſelfe, there all ſuch are lawfull, as the Word doth not forbid, and as no Circumſtance that a man ſhall

make

make choice of, shall be againſt the generall rules of the word concerning the ſame: But a Lott is a thing lawfull in it ſelfe, and the ſubiect-matter, manner, & other Circumſtances thereof are not determined by Gods Word, nor againſt the generall rules. Therefore a Lott in game is not prohibited, nor is againſt the generall rules of Gods Word otherwiſe. The Propoſition he confirmeth. *Firſt*, touching a thing lawfull in it ſelfe, by ſhewing that act to be lawfull in it ſelfe, which in Gods word, is either commaunded, or permitted expreſſely, or by iuſt conſequence. *Secondly*, touching the manner &c. by prooving the reſt of the Propoſition; which he indeavoureth to performe. (1.) By the Authority of *Calvin*. (2.) By Luke: 9. 50. (3.) By a gloſſe. (4.) By ſhewing that the circumſtance of time for free will

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offerings being not determined, they might have beene offered at at any time, and Sacrifices might have beene in any place before a certaine place was determined.

3. *Thirdly*, touching both the doing of every act, & the doing of it in this or that manner, by shewing that naturall reaſon will not, of it ſelfe affoard ſufficient direction, there muſt warrant be had out of God's Word, becauſe, *Whatſoever is not of* Rom.14 23. *Faith is ſinne*. Which Word is given vs in morall matters to ſupply the defect of it cauſed by our firſt parents their fall. Neither doth the Word abridge vs of the helpe, and vſe of naturall reaſon for direction in ſuch actions. The Aſſumption is thus prooved. Recreation, in generall, is warranted from the Word as permitted, and inioined if not expreſſely, yet by iuſt conſequence. For the matter or man-

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ner, or the thinges wherewith we may recreate our selves, there is nothing determined. Therefore any meanes that are not against the generall rules Of comelines, and decency, *Rom. 13. 13. 1. Cor. 14. 40.* Of conveniency, and expediency, *1. Cor. 6. 12.* and *10. 23. Rom. 14. 21.* Of Religion, and Piety, *1. Cor. 10. 31. Colos. 3. 17.* and the like, are by the Word of God allowed.

I might, as did *Alexander*, loose *I. B.* Gordian's knott with one choppe, and say, The vse of Lottes in game is forbidden in the Word, referring my selfe to what I have, and shall write. But for bettet satisfaction, I will answere more particularly, not doubtiug, but that the Proverbe may (now) proove true, viz: Pro. 10. 19. *In many wordes there cannot want iniquity.* 1. *First*, I obserue fearefull shifting, and *then* vnsound arguing. The former thus appeareth, He suppo-

feth the thing muſt be lawfull in it ſelfe, and diſputeth onely about the ſubiect-matter, &c. Againe, In the introduction he ſaith. Th'vſe of Lottes in game is not againſt God's Word, but hath ſufficient warrant from it, which may imply this poſition. [That is againſt the Word, which hath not ſufficient warrant from it.] But in the Propoſition of the maine argument his ground is; [Such things are lawfull, which the Word doth not forbid.] *Fower* of his confirmations, and his Aſſumption are to that *effect*, or rather *defect*, and his concluſion is anſwereable: Is not this a fearefull ſhifting courſe of reaſoning? Now let vs conſider his vnſound arguing. Touching the Propoſition of his maine argumcnt, I mervaile why *Mr. Gataker* avouching ſuch ſubiect-matter &c. to be lawfull as are not forbidden, limiteth this

aſſer-

assertion with theis wordes (Of a thing *lawfull in it selfe*) As if such a thing may warrant our retchlesnesse in, and about the subiect-matter &c. As if God doth not, according to the olde saying, [*Loue Adverbes*] An Oath is a thing lawfull in it selfe; Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subiect-matter, &c. be agreable to the Word of God? But I mervaile much more at this grounnd. [*Such things are lawfull, as the Word doth not forbid.*] I set it downe thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permitted, and therefore the subiect-matter, &c. of a thing lawfull in it selfe. I mervaile (I say) the more because *Mr. Gataker* confirmeth a thing or act it selfe to be lawfull in it selfe, if it be in the Word, either commaunded, or permitted ex-

preſſely, or by iuſt conſequence. Which I acknowledge to be ſo cleare a truth, that (me think's) *Mr. Gataker* cannot, but, in proportion of reaſon; if he beleive the Word to be perfect vnto every good worke, holde All thinges to be vnlawfull, which are not lawfull one of theis two wayes, and the rather becauſe he peremptorily affirmeth, *pag. 95.* All particular morall actions, be they never ſo iũdifferent, to be either conformable, or diſconformable to Gods Word, and, by particular actions, he meaneth actions clothed with circumſtances, *pag. 94.* O that *Mr. Gataker* would holde to this doctrine! Then should he thereby provoke all, who make conſciences of their wayes, *and doe truth* (that is, doe good workes ſincerily) *to come to the light, that their deedes might be made manifeſt, that they are wrought according*

Pſal. 19. 7. 2. Tim. 3. 15. 16. 17.

Iohn. 3. 21.

cording to God. On the contrary; If he bring not disciples *to the Law, and Testimony*, by doctrine according to the Word, but writhe from it, by teaching that to be lawfull which is not forbidden, as therein his light faileth, so thereby he shall make men careleſſe to ſeeke for their warrant, and wilfull to *ſeeke after their owne heart, and eyes after which they goe a whoring.* Well, let vs examine his confirmations. *Firſt, Mr. Calvins* teſtimony in English is this, [*When the Scripture delivereth generall rules of a lawfull vſe, the vſe is to be limited according to them.*] From hence *Mr. Gataker* concludeth that a man hath a ſufficient warrant for any circumſtance he ſhall make choiſe of, that is not againſt thoſe rules. *Mr. Calvin* ſpeaketh of an Vſe, and of an Vſe doe we diſpute, *Mr. Gataker* concludeth a Circumſtance: *Mr. Calvin* ſaith, According, *Mr. Gata-*

Iſa. 8. 20.

Num. 25 39.

1.

ker concludeth, Not againſt. Is
2. this ſound arguing? Is the 2. confirmation from *Luke: 9. 50.* much better? The wordes ſet downe by *Mr. Gataker* be theis. [*He that is not againſt me, is with me.*] This place (forſooth) is a rule holding in the ſubiect-matter, &c. neither determined, nor forbidden. As theis wordes, [*He that is not with me, is againſt me, Math. 12. 30.*] is a rule in the ſubiect-matter, &c. determined. Both a like in conceipt. And why may not *M. Gatakers?* conceipt be the ſame touching thinges, or actions? But let vs ſee, whether the conceipt be not a be-miſted *Phantaſy*. In the former place Chriſt his wordes are occaſioned by his Diſciples their forbidding one who caſt out Divels in Chriſt his name. Forbid him not (ſaid Chriſt) for, He, that is not againſt me, is with me. In the latter place Chriſt

Christ spake those wordes vpon occasion of the *Pharises* their opposition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions togither, this, indeed, is the summe. All men are either with, or against Christ. For there be no *Neutralles*. So that those two sentences are like theis. He that is not a goate, is a sheepe, and He that is not a sheepe is a goate. But *Mr. Gataker's* argument is this. All men who are not against Christ, are with him. Therefore Circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawfull. Is this sound arguing? The *third* confirmation is from a Glosse. 3.
Here I remember an olde saying [*A cursed glosse corrupt's the Text.*] Now lett vs see whether *Mr. Gataker* have any blessing by this glosse, the wordes whereof in English, be theis. [*All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.*] Note,

that it ſpeake's of things. Therefore it make's as well for actions, as for circumſtances. Is this *Divinity* ? But what Law ? If the *Civill* Law, what is that to the point ? Except *Mr. Gataker* can proove, the *Civill* Law to be a perfect rule to vs; and whatſoever it permitteth is allowed of God. Howſoever, (I ſay) this courſe of fetching prooſes from any other Law, than *God's* Law, is fitter for a *Papiſt*, who holdeth *Vnwritten verities* (ſo called) to be a ſupplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorize traditions of men, than for one, that feareth God to walke in his wayes. Is then this gloſſing ſound arguing ? Hath the *fourth* confirmation more validity in it than the reſt ? The former 3. prooſes ſpeake not directly of Circmmſtances according to the propoſition, (ſo doth *Mr. Gataker* diſpute *Ad idem*) here he doth; here

Deut. 10 12.

4.

here then I inquire, If the Circumſtances of Time, and Place be at the pleaſure of him that vſeth a thing lawfull in it ſelfe, doth it follow therevpon, that the ſubiect-matter, and manner be ſo too? If God allow any thing to be done, of neceſſity there muſt be a time, and place, when and where it may be done, Even when, and where there is iuſt occaſion of the Act. It is to be obſcrved, that, as here, ſo, in the Propoſition it ſelfe *Mr. Gataker* ſlideth from the ſubiect-matter, and manner, to circumſtances onely. Is not this fainting? Let vs now proceed to that, which *Mr. Gataker* writeth, touching both the doing of every act, and the doing of it in this, and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the Word if naturall reaſon, of it ſelfe, afford ſufficient directiõ. *Good Lord!*

What

What fearefull shifting from the Word is here ? But why doth he ioyne the doing it ſelfe of an Act. with the manner thereof ? I'le tell you, even to make a way to his Aſſumption. For, if he ſticke cloſe to that which he teacheth in imediate wordes, to witt, that an act it ſelfe is lawfull in it ſelfe, if, in the Word, it be, either commaunded; or permitted expreſſely, or by iuſt conſequence, he foreſeeth, that it will be anſwered to the fore-part of his aſſumption, that every Lott is not lawfull in it ſelfe. Therefore he would trouble the Reader's head with a ſuppoſed direction therein of naturall reaſon, and that ſufficient, (I ſay) *Suppoſed*; For he sheweth no direction therein of naturall reaſon either ſufficient, or inſufficient. But let vs with feare, and trembling, conſider *Mr. Gataker* his moſt ſtraunge poſition

to

to witt, [*Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the Word, if naturall Reason of it selfe, affoard sufficient direction.*] Let vs consider it (I say) together with his reason. For (saith he) the Word is given vs in morall matters, to supply the defect of naturall reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction, in morall matters, from naturall reason, before we consult with God in his Word? For the said direction is the 2. time vrged thus. I say where natnrall reason doth not, of it selfe, afford sufficient direction, and neede not a man know, that he hath warrant from God's Word if, in his perswasion, he have sufficient direction from naturall Reason? Doth the *Maxime* of Gods Spirit quoted here, by *Mr. Gataker* to witt, [*What is not of Faith is sinne*] Rom. 14 23.

intimate

intimate. That whatſoever is done by ſufficient direction from naturall reaſon, is of Faith? Became naturall reaſon onely defective, and not corrupted alſo by our
Rom. 8. 7. firſt Parents their fall? O God have mercy vpon vs! For I ſee that the Wiſedome of the Flesh is Enmity againſt thee; For it is not ſubiect to thy Law, neither, indeed, can be. But why doe I vexe my ſoule with this fearefull doctrine, ſeeing *Mr. Gatakers* heart fainteth in the proſecution thereof? For, at laſt, he cometh to ſay. Neither doth the Word abridge vs of the helpe, and vſe of naturall reaſon for direction in ſuch actions. Here is ſome more authority (to witt, Of not abridging vs of the helpe, &c.) given to the Word. For it doth imply, that the Word might abridge vs, &c. Therefore our moſt warrantable way is to be well infor-

informed, when, and how farre, the Word doth give vs leave to vſe the direction of naturall reaſon in morall matters. If this be ſo, then the former ſtrange doctrine is contradicted, and I neede not make any anſwer to the ſcriptures quoted in the margent. So then I proceed to the Aſſumption of the maine argument. In the former part whereof, it is to be denied (as was ſaide before) that every Lot is a thing lawfull in it ſelfe. For as a *Divinatory*, by him, *cap. 11.* ſo a *Luſorious Lott* by me, and others, is denied to be a thing lawfull in it ſelfe. More clearily to anſwer the other part. It is to be obſerved, that, in this large, argument it cannot be gathered whath *M. G.* meaneth by *Subiect-matter*. So the minde of the Reader may be troubled with wordes, which ought not to be. But by that which he writeth, *pag. 230.* I vnder- Acts. 15 24.

vnder ſtand he meaneth the Matter whereabout the Lottery is imployed. If ſo, I affirme that the ſubiect matter of a Lott is determined by God, namely, A Controverſy to be ended thereby; and therefore I alſo affirme luſorius buiſineſſe (to vſe *Mr. Gataker* owne word pag. 130.) to be a ſubiect-matter of a Lott, no leſſe againſt the gencrall rules of the Word, than was the finding out of *Ionas*, in *Mr. Gatakers* iudgment, *pag.278.* If then a Luſorious Lott be not a thing lawfull in it ſelfe, & If Luſorious buiſineſſe be a ſubiect-matter of a Lott, that is againſt the generall rules, then how can the manner, and other circumſtances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be ſufficient warrant for the vſe of a Luſorious Lott? Now then, Let vs try the force of the Aſſumption's confirmation. It

is true that Recreation in generall, indefinitely vnderstood, is warranted by God's Word. But I beleive *Mr. Gataker* will not affirme all recreations taken vp by men, to be so warranted. Yes (saith *Mr. Gataker*) we may recreate our selves with any thing, that is not against the generales rules, because, touching things, wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.

Of this evasion [*Not against*] I neede not speake at this instant. But touching things not determined, so much inculcated, I aske whether things must be determined particularly, or by name; or else, if not so forbidden, they are lawfull. If so, why doth *Mr. Gataker* (speaking of divers particulars,) as of a key, and a booke, of a paire of sheares, and a sive, and such like

ſo earneſtly aske, Are they any where found revealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another minde, than here, arguing thus. Not found there commaunded, or permitted; therefore vnlawfull. If it be ſaid, Not ſo found there, to finde out a theiſe. I then ſay; Neither are Lottes ſo found there for Recreation. But if by *Not determined* be meant, Thinges wherewith we recreare are not determined in the Word either expreſſly, or by iuſt conſequence, then, whoſoever ſaith ſo, if he be wiſe, will adde [*So farre as I doe remember, and know.*] For who can remember all the ſentences of holy Scriptures, and know all iuſt conſequences, that may be made from them? If he thus adde then his Negation is of no validity, but he himſelſe is too bolde in denying, vpon preſumption, that another remembreth, and knoweth no

more

more than he. At laſt let vs religiouſly conſider the generall rules ſo often ſpoken of, and we ſhall finde, that *Mr. Gataker* ſhould have done well not to have pleaſed *Libertines* by pleading *Not againſt*, but to have given the Word due honour by ſaying with *Mr. Calvin*. [The vſe of things is to be limited *according* to the generall rules.] For theis rules require *Decency*, *Expediency*, and *Piety*, and therefore they are not obeyed by the vſe of things not *vndecent*, not *inexpedient*, and not *impious*. For it is to be noted that in *1. Cor. 6. 12.* and *12. 23.* *Paul* ſaith not, all things are lawfull, but ſome things are inexpedient, but in both places thus. [*All things are lawfull, but all are not expedient.*] Let vs conſider theis rules yet ſomewhat more nearely to the point. Touching the *firſt*. The wordes of the Apoſtle, *1. Cor. 14. 40.* be theis.

[*Let all things be done honeſtly, and by order*] In which is no intimation, that all things are in themſelves lawfull to be done, which are done *honeſtly*, & *by order*, but a charge that all things, be they in themſelves never ſo lawfull, be done honeſtly, & by order. Thoſe drinke offerings to *Bacchus*, commonly called *Healthes* (*per Antiphraſin*,) are ſolemnized ſometimes with ſtanding, ſometimes with kneeling, alwayes with putting of hatts, and ſome ſpeech more or leſſe, are they acceptable to God, becauſe they are *thus* orderly carried? If not, Then be Lotts, and the vſers of them in gaming never ſo orderly diſpoſed, yet are they not therefore iuſtified.

2. Touching the *ſecond* rule. It is true, That all things muſt be expedient, that is, edify, *1. Cor. 10. 23.* Therefore they ſinne who ſtumble, *or offend a brother*, that is, occaſion

casion him to fall or be made weake, *Rom. 14. 13. 21.* But Luforious Lotts occasion *thousands* to fall into sinne,& to be weake in goodnesse. Therefore they doe not edifie,and therefore are not expedient. Concerning the *3. rule. Let all things to be done to Gods glory, 1. Cor. 10. 31.* Is this to Gods glory , to vse his name in any other case than wherein God is well pleased his name should be vsed,& thē to take that name in vaine? Is tempting of God any glory to God ? But playing with a Lott is to vse God's name in an other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed, and then also to take that Name in vaine, & it is a greivous tempting of God as shall be prooved. Therefore playing with a Lots is not to God's glory,& by consequence not agreable to *Religion*, and *Piety*. Though it be sufficiently prooved that Lusori- 3.

ous Lotts are directly aga inſt *two* of the generall Rules, and not warranted by the *third*, ſo that *Mr. Gataker* hath not bete red his cauſe by appealing to them, yet it is to be obſerved, that all the rules require, *Things*, and *Actions* to be according to them, But *Mr. Gataker* by onely ſpeaking of them, would iuſtify circumſtances, and meanes of playing with Lotts if (*forſooth*) they be not againſt them. Thus having evidently shewed Reaſons inducing (not drawing) *Mr. Gataker* to allow Luſorious Lotts to be both fearefull, as theis evaſive ſpeeches. [*Not evill in themſelves.*] [*Not prohibited.*] [*Not determined.*] &, [*Not againſt the generall rules,*] doe import, & otherwiſe vnſound, I wil now (with God's helpe I hope) reply vpon *M. G.* anſwers to mine arguments againſt playing with Lots, conteined in my Dialogue.

A Reply to M. Gataker's

Anſwers to arguments conteined in a Dialogue againſt the vnlawfulnes of games conſiſting in chaunce.

WHatſoever directly, or of it ſelfe, or in a ſpeciall manner tendeth to the advauncing of God's Name is to be vſed *religiouſly*, & not to be vſed in ſporte, as we may not pray, or ſweare in ſporte: But the vſe of Lotts directly, or of it ſelfe, and in ſpeciall manner tendeth to the advauncing of the name of God in attributing to his ſpeciall Provi-

Dialog. Mal. 6. 7. Exo. 20. 7. Iſa. 29. 13. Ier. 4. 2. Prov. 16. 33.

dence in the whole, and immediate
Acts. 1. 14.26. disposing of the Lot, & expecting the event. Therefore the vse of Lotts is not to be in sport.

Answ. p4.149. The Assumption is not true, if it be understood vniversally. The proofe annexed I deny; Neither doe the places produced proove it. The former of them, concerning ordinary Lotts, or Lotts in generall, was answered sufficiently before. The latter is an example of an extraordinary Lott, wherein was (*indeed*) an immediate, and speciall Providence. But extraordinary examples make no generall rules Neither is it a good course of arguing to reason from the speciall, or a singular, to the generall, and vniversall: Much lesse from one extraordinary act or event, to all ordinary courses of the same kinde. Herein is the difference betweene the one, and the other

That

That the one could not but fall certainly, were it never so often caſt, whereas the other, caſt often in the ſame caſe, would not certainely fall out ſtill the ſame.

The aſſumption vnderſtood vniverſally is true, and the places quoted make good the proofe thereof, as ſhall be made manifeſt. *Reply 1.*

Firſt therefore let vs conſider the ſuppoſed diſtinction betweene ordinary, and extraordinary Lottes *Mr. Gataker* ſpeaketh of a diſtinction, but sheweth not wherein, (touching the Lottes themſelves,) it doth conſiſt. Indeed, touching themſelves, (as they be Lottes,) there is no difference; For in an ordinary, as well as in an extraordinary Lott, the things are by man, of purpoſe intentionally diſpoſed vnto a variable event, & they are wholy diſpoſed by God vnto this, or vnto that event, 1.

which the vſer of a Lott expecteth. If ſo, then it followeth, That the vſe of all Lottes, (*as they be Lottes*) whether ordinary, or extraordinary, directly, or of it ſelfe, & in ſpeciall maner, tendeth to the advauncing of the Name of God. How? The vſe of Lottes attributeth to Gods ſpeciall Providence In the whole, and immediate diſpoſing of the Lott, & In expecting the event. Doth this ſcarce carry good ſence? Is there then no difference betweene an ordinary, and extraordinary Lott? The onely difference is the *ſubiect-matter* whereabout the Lott is imployed. The *ſubiect-matter* of an ordinary Lott, is, by God's allowance, A Controverſy to be ended: The *ſubiect-matter* of an extraordinary Lott is any other matter, whereabout a Lott is imployed by God's ſpeciall direction; otherwiſe it is

vnlawfull

vnlawfull, as be luſorious, and Divinatory Lotts. In regard of which difference onely, *Mr. Gatakers* Logique holdeth good, as thus. From the vſe of a Lott about an other matter than ending a Controverſy and that by God's ſpeciall direction, it followeth not, that it is lawfull to vſe a Lott about any other matter, than ending a Controverſy, as gaming, without God's ſpeciall direction. But *Mr. Gataker* maketh an other difference to witt, An immediate, and ſpeciall Providence in an extraordinary Lott, which is not in an ordinary Lott. He doth ſo; and therefore in his Logique, he cunningly ioyneth a ſuppoſed extraordinary Event to a ſuppoſed extraordinary Act, & declineth the proofe of an extraordinary act, which rather he ſhould have done, becauſe mine argument ſtandeth vpon the Vſe

of

of Lottes. Neither doth he soundly proove an immediate, and speciall Providence, or extraordinary event, to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lott. For, as it is a tempting of God to cast an extraordinary Lott the first time without God's speciall direction, *pag. 313.* so it is a tempting, yea, a greater tempting of God, when he hath given his iudgment already by the event of the Lott, to cast the Lott againe without his speciall direction. How then can *Mr. Gataker* so confidently affirme, that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly, were it never so oft cast? Indeed, The certaine event of an extraordinary Lot may, in faith, be expected, because of Gods speciall direction. And why not so in an ordinary Lott? Seeing God adviseth vs, *pag. 135.* to vse Lottes for the ending

of

of controverſies. *Prov. 18. 18.* and aſſureth vs that the whole diſpoſing of them is of him, *Prov. 16. 33.* But *Mr. Gataker* hath anſwered this place before. Let vs then conſider what he hath anſwered. Before he ſaith, *pag. 144.* Good Authours expound this place of ſingular, extraordinary, and miraculous Lottes onely. But (ſaith he) the wordes ſeeme to be more generall, and are, word for word, thus in the Originall, [*The Lord is caſt into the Lappe, but every iudgment, or diſpoſing of it, is of God.*] Doth not confuting them, who holde onely extraordinary Lottes to be meant in this place, and tranſlating the Text [*Every iudgment*] and expounding it, [*Or diſpoſing of it,*] ſhew plainely that this place prooveth mine Aſſumption to be vniverſally true? So that I much mervaile that he denieth this

this place to prooue mine Aſſumption, becauſe it concerneth Lottes in generall. For if it doe ſo, then it prooveth that ordinary, as well as extraordinary Lottes tend to the advauncing of the Name of God. Againe *pag. 145. Mr. Gataker* taking the wordes, as they are vſually read in the *Geneva tranſlation*, and the *King's edition*, to witt, [*The Lott is caſt into the lappe, but the whole diſpoſition, or diſpoſing thereof is of the Lord*,] graunteth that the whole event is of God. A graunt though true, yet turning the reader aſide from ſeeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [*The whole diſpoſing of the Lott caſt into the lappe.*] If then the Lot caſt into the lap, that is, *of purpoſe* diſpoſed by man vnto a variable event, be wholy diſpoſed by God, ſo, as the event be that, which pleaſeth him, then God doth not *mediately* diſpoſe the Lot to this, or that event,

event, if not *mediately*, then *immediately*, becauſe the whole diſpoſing is of him. Doth not then this place make good mine Aſſumption? But for all this *Mr. Gataker* will not have it ſo; For as he tranſlateth this place, he ſaith It importeth thus much, [That there is a Providence in all things, even the leaſt, and moſt caſuall] and this he would confirme by theis my wordes, viz: [The diſpoſing of the chaunce is ſecret, that it might be chaunce indeed, & wholy of God, who directed all things.] Doe theis wordes iuſtifie *Mr. Gatakers* interpretation of this place? Yes; For they ſay plainely, God directed all things, and, they ſay withall; The diſpoſing of the chaunce (that is of the things purpoſedly diſpoſed by a man vnto a variable event) vnto a certaine event, is ſecret, that it may be chaunce indeed, that

is,

is, an event not by the will of man, but wholy of God. So that my wordes imply this argument. God directeth all things, Therefore much more, in our discerning, a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is farre from saying that this place importeth onely, That there is a Providence in all things. Neither doth *Mr. Gataker's* translation inferre this imported interpretation. For this discretion. [*But*] doth so oppose every iudgment, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth *Iudgment*) to a Lot cast into the lappe, as that *Every disposing*, is all one with *The whole disposing*. This place so troubleth *Mr. Gataker* that from it he would have no more gathered, than that the whole event (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as working by meanes in the most of them, and not implying and immediate

diate Providence vniverſally in them. I neede not examine the meanes, or immediate Providence of all the inſtances quoted in the margent For here it is *impliedly* graunted (for he ſaith not *All*, but the *moſt* of them) that in ſome things God worketh not by meanes, and that there is an immediate Providence *Particularly*, for he denieth ſuch a Providence onely, as being *vniverſally*. Howſoever it be in other things, I thinke it is manifeſt to all, that will ſee, that God, without meanes, and therefore *immediately*, doth wholy diſpoſe the Lot caſt into the lappe vnto this, or that event, what pleaſeth him, whereas man diſpoſeth the things onely vnto a variable event. As at cardes, man shuffleth them of purpoſe to diſpoſe them vnto a variable event: But, by the immediate Providence of God, they are

ſo shuffled, as that this, or that event followeth. Therefore (*with Mr. Gataker favour*) any reaſonable man may iudge it not ſenſeleſſe to ſay (which he doubteth of *pa. 147.*) that in childrens playes, at *Even, and Odde*, or at *Heades, & Points*, there is an immediate Providence, In inclining the will of the childe, and guiding his coniecture. Thus we ſee this place doth confirme mine aſſumption, and the proofe annexed, *Mr. Gatakers* interpretation notwithſtanding. But he giveth 2. reaſons againſt an immediate providence in ordinary Lottes, which
1. are alſo to be conſidered. The *former* is this. That which agreeth to a thing, as it is ſuch, agreeth neceſſarily to all things, that are ſuch. Therefore if there be an immediate Providence in a Lot, as it is caſuall, then there is an immediate providence in all thinges, that are caſuall:

casuall : But the latter is not true; *ergo* not the former, *pag.* 143. Why not the latter ? if theis Positions be true. That which seemes Chaunce to us , is a certaine Word of God (saith *Bernard*, But *Mr. Gatak.* transSermo quidam lateth it , Is *as* a word of God) acquainting vs with his Will ; *pag.* 17. and In casuall events there is nothing guiding them, but God's Providence , *pag.* 22. But suppose that there is not an immediate Providence in all things , that be casuall, what is that to the purpose ? For all things casuall are not *such*, with a Lott, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man vnto an vncertaine event , which things , so disposed by man , are wholy disposed by God vnto a certaine event , this or that ; so it is not in all other things, that be casuall. Therefore all other casuall things , and Lotts are not *such*. Neither is it said an

immediate Providence is in a Lot, as it is casuall, but as the Lot being made casuall is wholy disposed by God to this, or that event. So that from *Mr. Gatakers axiome* this argument may be framed. An immediate Providence, in an extraordinary Lot, is acknowledged by *Mr. Gataker* as it is a Lot (say I) wholy disposed by God; Therefore an immediate Providence is in an ordinary Lot (as it is a Lot) wholy disposed by God. For there is no difference betweene theis sorts of Lotts, (as they be Lotts) and so disposed. For *Mr. Gataker* hath shewed that *Prov. 16. 33.* speaketh as well of one sort of Lotts, as of another. The other argument is this which is the *kill-kow*. If in every Lott there be necessarily an immediate worke, and Providence of God, then is it in the naturall of man to make God worke immediately

diately at his pleaſure : But to ſay, that it is in man's power naturally to ſett God on working, immediately, at his pleaſure, is abſurd. There is not therefore an immediate worke, and Providenee of God neceſſarily in every Lott. *Mr. Gataker* like an Oratour, ſeemeth deſirous to draw his adverſary into hatred by thei wordes [*Neceſſarily, Naturall power, Sett God on working, At pleaſure, To ſay, and Abſurd*] *Verba dum ſint, ſurdo canit.* But hoping better, I aunſwering his Logique, deny the Aſſumption. For it is as much in man's naturall power to ſet God on worke immediately, in an ordinary, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God, and man doe reſpectively as much in the one Lott, as in the other. But an extraordinary Lot is by the ſpeciall direction of God : True; So is an ordinary Lott by God's

ſpeciall adviſe to ende a controverſy. If then every Lot be a ſetting of our glorious God on worke, there ought to be prayer, if not by wordes; yet in heart in the vſe as well of ordinary, as extraordinary Lotts. If ſo, then Lotts are not to be vſed in ſport. Here then will I proceed to the defence of my ſecond argument, which is this, *pag. 150.*

Dialog. We are not to tempt the Almighty by a vaine deſire of manifeſting his power, and ſpeciall Providence: But by vſing Lotts in ſport we tempt the Almighty, vainely deſiring the manifeſtation of his ſpeciall Providence in his immediate diſpoſing; Therefore we may not vſe Lotts in ſport. The Aſſumption (ſaith *Mr. Gataker*) they ſeeme to proove on this wiſe. To call God to ſitt in iudgment, where there is no neceſ-

Pſal. 78. 18. 19. Iſa. 7. 12 Math. 4. 6. 7.

neceſſity ſo to doe, for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to *mocke* God: But by the vſe of Lotts in ſport, God is called to ſitt in iudgment, where is no neceſſity, for the determining of trifles. By the vſe of Lotts in ſport therefore, we doe tempt, and dishonour God. This argument *Mr. Gataker* hath from *Daneus* that learned man of reverend memory. To proove the Aſſumption whereof, he alleadgeth theis wordes out of my Dialogue. A Lot in the nature thereof doth as neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Providence, and *determining preſence* of God, as an Oath, in the nature thereof, doth ſuppoſe the *teſtifying preſence* of God, yea ſo, that, as in an Oath, ſo in a Lot, prayer is expreſſed, or to be vnderſtood.

Aunſw. The Aſſumption of the maine Argument is not true, but onely in extraordinary Lottes, vſed not with out ſpeciall direction. Yea rather, if a Lot be ſuch as is here ſaid, it is not lawful to vſe Lottes in any caſe whatſoever. Becauſe thereby we require a worke of God's immediate Power, and Providence, and ſo tempt God. And to ſpeake as the truth is. By this courſe, and force of this diſcourſe, the onely lawfull vſe of a Lot is condemned, & an vnlawfull vſe of it is allowed in the roome of it. Againe: An Oath, and a Lot are not alike. The compariſon therefore laide betweene them will not holde. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot, put to the ſpeciall providence, and imediate worke of God, as the truth of the thing teſtified is in an Oath, put to his Teſtimony: Neither is there in every

every Lot any ſuch ſolemne invocation of God, as there is in an Oath ever, either expreſſed, or implied. For the definition of each thing conteineth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without mention of Prayer, as appeareth in the definition thereof in the Dialogue: But ſo cannot an Oath. Therefore Prayer is not of the eſſence of a Lot. Neither doe the places, *1. Sam. 14. 41. Acts 1. 24.* (whereof the former was a faithleſſe prayer) proove it. They proove onely, that prayer was ſometimes vſed before an extraordinary Lot, for an immediate Providence to direct the event of it. Which is not lawfull in ordinary Lotts. For in ſetting forth tithes, *Levit. 27. 32.* it was not lawfull to pray God to give a right Lot. In election of offices ſacred, or civill prayer

ought to be vſed, yet it followeth not therefore, that Prayer is part of the choiſe, or that therefore the Election, in the nature thereof, doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe a ſpeciall providence, and determining preſence of God. Laſtly, A Lott is not in it ſelfe an holy thing alwayes, and neceſſarily, as hath beene shewed, nor indeed was ever any ſo ſave extraordinarily. Therefore there is difference betweene Lotts and Oathes. Indeed, Whoſoever shall contemne an extraordinary Lot, he shall abuſe an holy thing, and Gods Name.

Reply 2. To this long anſwer I might make a short reply. For whereas *Mr. Gataker's* maine ground is this. There is no immediate providence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinrry Lot, and therevpon he buildeth theis anſweres, Therefore there is no tempting of God by

by vſing Lotts in ſport: Therefore no prayer expreſſed, or to be vnderſtood is required in ordinary Lotts: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is not an holy thing in it ſelfe; I might, (referring my ſelfe to the defence of my former argument,) breifely reply, and ſay. There is an immediate providence in an ordinary Lot. Therefore God is tempted by vſing Lotts in ſporte: Therefore Prayer expreſſed, or to be vnderſtood, is required of them who vſe an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is an holy thing: But ſomething more in replying, will have more favour in reading. Therefore I firſt mervaile that *M. G.* forgetteth himſelfe in concluding. That all Lotts be vnlawfull, if there be an immediate providence in all Lotts. What? Were extraordinary Lotts vnlawfull too? Nay; He vnderſtan-

vnderſtandeth an exception of them becauſe they were commaunded by God. So I ſay, ordinary Lotts were adviſed by God to end controverſies. Therefore vſing them, in that caſe, is no tempting of God. I mervaile alſo, why *Mr. Gataker* should ſo confidently affirme, that, by this courſe, that is, by maintaining an immediate Providence in all Lotts, an vnlawfull vſe of a Lott is allowed in the roome of the onely lawfull vſe. But I referre the diſcuſſing thereof to the defence of my *3.* argument. Againe, It is to be obſerved, that he ſett's downe a compariſon betweene an Oath, and a Lott, which I ſett not downe, whereby the minde of the reader may be troubled. For I ſay not, As the *Truth* of a thing is, by an Oath, put to Gods Teſtimony: ſo in an ordinary Lot the *Right* of a thing is put

to

to Gods immediate Providence. This is that I ſay, As an Oath, in the nature thereof, ſuppoſeth the *teſtifying preſence* of God : ſo a Lot, in the nature thereof, ſuppoſeth the *determining preſence* of God. My reaſon is, Ending a controverſy (I ſay not, Deciding a Right, for, before dividing the land of Promiſe by Lot, no tribe, or family could chalenge more Right to one portion, than to another) Ending (I ſay) a Controverſy is, by a Lot referred to God's determining the ſame by his whole, or immediate diſpoſing the vncertaine Lot) to a certaine event. It is alſo to be obſerved that in the 2. compariſon betweene an Oath, and a Lot, touching Prayer, he ſaith, Neither is there in every Lot any ſuch ſolemne invocation. Therefore in ſome Lot, that is, an extraordinary Lot, becauſe of an immediate Providence

vidence to direct the event of it. For the ſame cauſe (ſay I) is prayer to be expreſſed , or vnderſtood in the vſe of an ordinary Lot too. But (ſaith *Mr. Gataker*) Prayer is of the eſſence of an Oath , and not of a Lott. I have ſaid nothing to the contrary ; So that he might have ſpared his definition of a Lot: But becauſe he taketh a definition (ſuch as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will ſay ſomewhat thereto. The Definition (ſo called) is from *Lyra*, viz. *To vſe Lotts is by a variable event of ſome ſenſible thing to determine ſome doubtfull , or vncertaine matter.* How is this matter to be determined indeed ? Even by God's whole, or immediate diſpoſing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination ? and Is not then Prayer to be expreſſed , or vnderſtood in a Lot , that is, in the managing by the vſers thereof ?

Now

Now then let vs consider the places produced to proove it. The former (saith *Mr. Gataker*) was faithlesse, I say so too, Because that Lot was without any warrant. This (notwithstanding Prayer in this, and the other place) doth shew that God's people beleiving that God doth signifie his iudgment by the whole, or immediate disposing of that Lot, did therefore thinke themselves bound to pray. But both theis Lotts were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate providence of God. Therefore they might well beleive they should pray. True; So all Christians may, yea and must beleive they ought to pray in the vsing ordinary Lotts, because of God's immediate Providence excercised therein. Nay; It was vnlawfull in setting out Tithe. If so; Not because it

it was an ordinary Lot (If a Lot) but becauſe the Lord expreſly ſaid *Of all that goeth vnder the rodde the tenth ſhall be holy.* The inſtance of election of offices is beſides the purpoſe- For it is not argued thus. Becauſe Gods people prayed when they vſed a Lot, therefore there is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot: But thus. There is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot, therefore Gods people prayed when they vſed a Lot. If then there be an immediate Providence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof, Prayer is to be expreſſed, or vnderſtood in lawfull vſe of a Lot, then *Praying* and *Playing*, (though they *rime* well together, yet) *runne* not well together in the lawfull vſe of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both That a Lot is not to be vſed but in a caſe of neceſſity more, or leſſe; and Therefore

refore ſtraunge (I will not ſay abſurd) is *Mr. Gataker* his Poſition, *pag. 111.* to witt, The leſſe weighty the matter is wherein a Lot vſed, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be prooved, That the leſſe weighty the matter is, the greater is the neceſſity of ending the controverſy by a Lot. The ſaid Poſition is more ſtrange becauſe he graunteth, *pag. 95.* That Prayer ſpecially applyed to the Lot may, (in ſome caſe,) be conceived, where the matter is more weighty, and the event of ſome conſequence, as in the choiſe of a Magiſtrate. But concerning this alſo more ſhall be ſaid in my next Reply. *Laſtly*; It ſerves my turne that *Mr. Gataker* acknowledgeth that God's Name, and an Holy thing is abuſed whenſoever an extraordinary

Lot it contemned, becauſe an immediate Providence of God is therein. For the ſame cauſe an ordinary Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and therefore not to be abuſed in ſport. But *Mr. Gataker* hath shewen before that a Lot is not, in it ſelfe, an holy thing. Indeed; He would have shewen in his 3. reaſon inducing him to allow luſorious Lotts; as not evill in themſelves, that a Lot is not holy either in it ſelfe, or by divine inſtitution. Wherevnto I have already anſwered ſomewhat. But having learned more (occaſionally) by his further diſpute, I will now, for ſome more ſatisfaction, anſwere ſomewhat more. A Lot (ſaith *Mr. Gataker*, *pag. 132.* and *133.*) is not holy, either in it ſelfe, becauſe a Caſualty hath no holineſſe in it ſelfe; For then all Caſualties should be holy: or By divine inſtitution in the

the Word, ſanctifying it to ſome holy Vſe. I anſwere breifely. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an Holy thing in it ſelfe, becauſe of God's immediate Providence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in reſpect of the ſame Providence? If it be, Then, though all caſualties be not holy in themſelves, yet all lawfull Lotts be holy in themſelves. So that as the Bush that burnt, and waſted not, was holy, when God manifeſted himſelfe to *Moſes* in it, *pag. 156*, ſo a Lot is holy, becauſe of God's ſpeciall Preſence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, becauſe God was preſent in it but for a time: Whereas a Lot is holy from time to time, ſo oft as it is lawfully vſed, becauſe of God's ſpeciall preſence therein from time to time. Therefore Howſoever ſport might have beene made with the Bush the ſpeciall preſece of God being remooved, yet ought ſport never be made

with a Lot, becauſe God's ſpeciall preſence is ever therein. Againe; I neede not proove that an ordinary Lot to ende controverſies is by divine inſtitution in the word, ſeeing *Mr. Gataker* graunteth that God in *Prov. 18. 18.* adviſeth vs to vſe it to that ende. But it is not ſanctified to an holy vſe. I have shewed otherwiſe. But what then? Is not a Lot therefore alwayes holy in it ſelfe, as *Mr. Gataker* ſaith in this paſſage? Were all extraordinary Lotts ſanctified to holy vſes? Yet *Mr. Gataker* deemeth them all holy in themſelves, becauſe of God's immediate Providence in them. Why may not I, for the ſame cauſe, thinke the ſame of all ordinary Lotts? And the rather, becauſe *Mr. Gataker* ſaith, *pag. 227.* Marriage, being Gods Ordinaunce, is holy in it ſelfe: But (as he acknowledgeth, *pag. 1.*) a Lot is

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Gods Ordinaunce; Therefore, from his graunt, a Lot is holy in it ſelfe. If then a Lot be holy in it ſelfe I conclude with *Mr. Gataker, pag. 133.* It may in no caſe, with no caution, be made matter of ſport. Now then I proceed to my *3.* argument, which is this, *pag. 166.*

Whatſoever God hath ſanctified to a proper end, is not to be perverted to a worſe end: But God hath ſanctified Lotts to a proper end, viz: To end Controverſies; Therefore man is not to pervert them to a worſe, viz: To play, and by playing to get away another mans money, which, without controverſy is his owne. The Aſſumption is amplified by the like vſe of an Oath. *Dialog.* Mat. 21. 12. 13. Numb. 26. 55. Prov. 18 18. Heb: 6: 16.

This *Argumẽt* is faulty. But may be mended *thus.* That which God hath ſanctified to *ſome* proper vſe is not to be applied to any *other*, eſpecial- a *worſe.* But God hath ſanctifyed *Anſw.*

Lotts to this propre vſe, to witt, the deciding of Controverſies in matters of weight; A Lott therefore may not be applied to any other vſe, much leſſe to a worſe. But to aunſwere the argument. The Propoſition is graunted, if, [*To Sanctifie*] be vnderſtood in a larger ſenſe, as meates are ſaid to be ſanctified, by God's word, for man's food, and The vnbeleiving mate ſanctified to the maried beleever, and if thereby be alſo vnderſtood the ſanctification, and approbation of the whole kinde. To the Aſſumption, and amplification thereof, it is anſwered. That place, *Prov. 18. 18.* doth not inioyne the vſe of a Lot; Nor reſtraineth it to the ending of ſtrife, Much leſſe to the ending of great quarrells onely, For, ending ſtrife is but one vſe amongſt many, *Ioshua, 7. 14. Ionas 1. 7. 1. Sam. 14. 42. Levit. 16. 8; 9.* So

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Hebr. 6. 16. doth not shew that ending a Controversy is the onely lawfull vse of an Oath. For there be other vses of it, As, to give assurance of the performance of Covenants, and promises. For, what controversy was there betweene *Ionathan*, and *David* to be ended by Oath when they sware either to other? 1. Sam. 20. 16. 17. 42.

I would thanke *Mr. Gataker* for mending mine argument, though there be not any great neede, if he had not put into his Assumption theis wordes [*In matters of weight*] for his owne purpose, as shall appeare. But to the matter. In mine vnderstanding, and meaning, the Proposition doth sufficiently expresse all that which mooveth *Mr. Gataker* to graunt it. Well, Then let vs consider his opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth *Mr. Gata-* *Reply.*

ker imply a Lot not be ſanctified, becauſe (as he ſaith now peremptorily) it is not inioyned? What! Is Recreation (in generall) inioyned by precpt, if not directly, yet (at leaſt) by iuſt conſequence, as *Mr. Gataker* in his allowance of luſorious Lotts, ſaith is graunteth by all, *pag. 138*? and is not ſo vſefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end Controverſies, inioyned by precept either directly, or by iuſt conſequence? Doth God more carefully provide for recreation, than for peace amongſt his people? But *Mr. Gataker* is not ſo peremptory in an other place, *pag. 135.* where he ſaith, The vſe of Lotts is not ſimply commaunded, For. *Prov. 18. 18.* is Rather a permiſſion than a precept. & Not ſo much a *commaundement* as an *adviſe*, & *counſaile*. I will come to an iſſue. If it will pleaſe *M. G.* to ſet downe his iuſt conſequence

to

to proove Recreation inioyned by precept, I will vndertake to ſett downe as iuſt a conſequence to proove, that a Lot to end a Controverſy is likewiſe inioyned by precept. In meane while I cannot be perſwaded that our God of peace, who commaundeth vs to ſeeke peace, and follow after it, and hath ordeined a Lot, wherein he is ſpecially preſent by his immediate providence, to end controverſies, which otherwiſe cannot be ended conveniently, doth leave vs at liberty in that caſe, to vſe, or not to vſe a Lot. But ſuppoſe the vſe of a Lot be not (*thus*) inioyned, yet doth not Gods counſel (which *me thinkes* is a cõmandemẽt though it be ſaid of *mans conſell* that it is no commaundement) ſanctify it to be vſed to end controverſies. This (*I thinke*) will not be denied: But it is denied That the vſe of a Lot is reſtrained to end

Pſal. 34. 14.

controverſies , much leſſe great quarrelles onely , and ſundry inſtances are given of vſing Lotts to other endes than to end controverſies. But all thoſe Lotts were extraordinary. Therefore, whereas in the beginning of this anſwere where he would finde fault with mine argvment , he ſaith, That the vſe of Lotts in play is ever to decide ſome queſtion , or controverſy, though a light one (it is like) yet a queſtion , or controverſy truely ſo tearmed , otherwiſe it were no Lot. If he meane a Lot in generall , then (with his favour) he forgetteth himſelfe in ſaying Lotts, by him quoted were not to end controverſies: If he ſpeake of a Lot in play, as beinga n ordinary Lot, then he faileth in iudgment, In denying that the vſe of ordinary Lotts (whereof is the queſtion) is reſtrained to end controverſies , and The

inſtances

inſtances which he giveth being extraordinary Lotts, are not to the point. Beſides: The ſubiect-matter of an extraordinary Lot being by God's ſpeciall direction, if it be lawfull, there may (happily) be no preſent controverſy. Whereas, the ſubiect-matter of an ordinary Lot, being ſomething queſtioned betweene man, & man, there may be a great controverſy. I ſay, May be, For if it be well obſerved, in an ordinary Lot there is not alwayes a preſent controverſy to be determined: But alwayes ſome queſtion to be decided to prevent a controverſy. As may appeare by *Mr. Gataker's* owne wordes, partly here, where he ſaith [That there muſt be ſome queſtion, or controverſy, or elſe it is no Lot,] but more evidently, where he ſaith: That the Lot vſed by the ſouldiers about Chriſt his garments, which he truly calleth

a ſerious diviſory Lot, was to prevent all contention, and ſtrife, *pag. 176. & 177.* Such was the Lot alſo which was vſed about dividing, the Land of Promiſe, about which was no preſent controverſy. For God, who would have no controverſies, whould have alſo ſuch things remooved which may cauſe, or iuſtly occaſion controverſies. Therefore Chriſt expounding the commaundement. Thou shallt not kill, forbiddeth wordes of provocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common, controverſies, and the occaſions thereof be, giveth direction in *Prov. 18. 18.* That which is ſaid of an ordinary Lot may iuſtly be alſo ſaid of an Oath, that the vſe of it is ſanctified to end controverſies by preſent determination, or prevention. For, as it is true, that *Heb. 6. 16.* implieth, that Gods Oath

Math. 5. 21. 22.

to

to man is more inviolable, than an *Oath* from man to man, whereof onely, *M. G.* taketh knowledge, so it is true, that *Heb. 6. 16.* intimateth, That, as an *Oath*, for confirmation, is amongst men an end of all strife: so Gods *Oath* for confirmation of his promise to *Abraham*, was to put the matter out of doubt, question, or controversy. Else, theis wordes [*An end of all strife*] were to no purpose. But that they were to the purpose by me vnderstood, appeareth in the 2. *next vers.* where it is written. *That God bound himselfe by Oath as to shew the stablenesse of his Counsell, so that the heires of promise might have strong cousolation*. So that Gods *Oath* to *Abraham* tooke away doubting, questioning, & all strife that might be, not onely in *Abrahãs* minde, but also in the mindes of the *heires of promise*. Therefore an *Oath* doth not onely end presẽt *cõtroversies*, according to

pa, 178.

M. G. vnder-

vnderſtanding, but confirming a promiſe, or covenant doth alſo ende a ſtrife, though there be none preſent, when the Oath is given, to wit, by *Prevention*. Now let vs ſomewhat conſider *Mr. Gatakers* purpoſe in putting into the Aſſumption, theis wordes [*In matters of weight.*] Forſooth, By denying the the ſame, to make way for light matters, and conſequently for playing with Lottes. Becauſe (as he ſaith, *pag. 130.*) they beſt agree with the nature of Lotts, that is, with vncertaine hazard. Surely, If *Mr. Gataker* had acknowledged God's ſpeciall preſence by his immediate Providence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God, to end controverſies, he would not have ſo written, but deemed weighty matters beſt agreeing with the nature of a Lot. It is true that a matter of leſſe weight in it ſelfe

ſelfe may be the ſubiect-matter of a controverſy, as a controverſy may be among men, as well meane, as might, yin their ſtate, as *Mr. Gataker* here ſaith *pa. 137.* For by mighty men (as in *Gen. 6. 4.* ſo) in *Prov. 18. 18.* are meant Men ſtrong in their affections, ſo as the controverſy cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the ſubiect-matter of the Controverſy be of more, or leſſe weight in it ſelfe; ſo as there is a neceſſity that one or both parties be ſatisfied. For otherwiſe there may be a great quarrell about a matter of leſſe weight. Neither doe I ſay, that onely great quarrells are to be ended, or prevented by a Lot, as *Mr. Gataker* denieth not, but ſome may. For (as he ſaith truly, *pag. 173.*) God ſpeaketh in *Prov. 18. 18.* of contentions in generall. Here then we may enter into further conſideration

of

of that which *Mr. Gataker* writeth, *pag. 135.* to wit. That, by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the onely lawfull vse is condemned, and an vnlawfull vse is allowed in the roome thereof. What is that Onely lawfull vse of a Lot? I can finde none other than The putting of that to a Lot which he calleth (*pag. 130.*) A matter of mere indifferency, that is, Such as is not materiall, whether a man doe, or omitt: Howsoever there may be a lawfull vse of a Lot about such a matter questioned to determine, or prevent a Controversy, yet I wonder that *Mr. Gataker* deemeth it that onely lawfull. Doth not he graunt, *pag. 91.* That Prayer specially applyed to a Lot may be conceived in weighty matters, as in the choise of a Magistrate, which is not a matter of mere indifferency, that is, such

as is not materiall whether it be done or omitted. Did God ſpecially appoint Lotts to be vſed about onely matters of weight? and muſt man ſo farre ſwerve from Gods example as to ſtrive onely about matters of ſuch indifferency, and then to putt onely ſuch, controverted, to the determination of a Lot? So that I doubt not but that with ſound iudgment, and a cleare conſcience not accuſing me of not duely reſpecting the ſpeciall Providence, of God by his immediate diſpoſing of a Lot, I may affirme. That the more weighty the ſubiect-matter of a controverſy is, the more iuſtifiable is the Controverſy: and Be that matter of more or leſſe weight, the greater the neceſſity of ending a Controverſy is, the more iuſtifiable is the vſe of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an *irreligious* abu-

ſing of Gods Ordinance? But (ſaith *Mr. Gataker* glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot.) The vſe of a Lot in play is ever to decide ſome queſtion, or controverſy truely ſo tearmed. If ſo, Then he might have called it a ſerious Lot, according to his doctrine, the lightneſſe of the ſubiect-matter controverted, notwithſtanding. But whereabout is that ſuppoſed Controverſy? *Mr. Gataker* in his written anſwere to my Dialogue, before mentioned, ſayth. The Controverſy tendeth to Victory, which till it be decided, there is a Controverſy though a *light one*, yet a Controverſy, truely ſo tearmed. But is that truely or worthily to be called A Victory, which falleth out by hap-hazard (according to *M. Gatakers* eſteeming a Lot) without any deſert? But (ſay I) Is it not a tempting of God to put him,

him, by his immediate Providence in disposing the Lot, to *humour* (I say not, *honour*) some of the vaine glorious fooles with supposed Victory, who make a pretended controversy there-about, whereas (before they intended to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a Controversy truly so tearmed? I need say no more, and therefore proceed to the last argumēt (whereof, but part is mine) It is this, *pag. 173.*

That, which there is neither precept for, nor practise of, in Gods word, generall, or speciall, expressed or implied, that there is no warrant for in the word: But such is the vse of Lotts in game. For we reade in Scripture that Lotts were vsed, but in serious matters onely, both by *Iewes*, and *Gentiles*; Neither is there any warrant in the Word for the ludicrous vse of *Dial.* 4.

them, by precept, or practiſe, generall, or ſpeciall, expreſſed, or implied, There is no warrant therefore for luſorious Lotts in Gods word.

Aunſw. The Propoſition is vnſound. For an argument holdeth (indeed) from the Negative in matters of *Faith*, but not in matters of *Fact*. Much leſſe may a man reaſon from a matter of *Fact*, to a matter of *Right* negatively. For many things are of ordinary vſe, whereof there is no mention at all in Gods Word, which yet all generally allow, as

2. ſugar for ſweetning, &c. *Secondly*; An action may have warrant ſufficiently by permiſſion, without precept, or practiſe. For where God hath not limited the vſe of any creature, or Ordinance, there he hath left the vſe of it free: Where he hath not determined the Circumſtances of any action, there, what

what he hath not prohibited, that he hath permitted. For this cauſe, in the point of Gods worship, the argument holdeth from the Negative, for the ſubſtance of it. Becauſe God hath determined it: But in civill affaires, it will not holde from the Negative to diſallow ought, becauſe God hath not determined them. Ier.7.31 & 19.5. Col.2.22 23. Deu.12 30.31.32

Mr. Gataker in his booke sheweth many inſtances of Lotts vſed both by *Iewes*, and *Gentiles*, and all in ſerious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they, by the light not onely of the Word, but of nature too, diſcerned, that Lotts are to be vſed onely in ſerious matters. O let vs take heed how we put out ſo great light. But let vs conſider his anſwere, which is onely to the Propoſition, though I have already confuted many principall parts thereof. In my *Dialogue* to shew *Reply 4.*

that the Spirit ſometime reaſoneth from a matter of *Fact* to a matter of *right*, negatively, I quote theis Scriptures, *Iohn 8. 39. 40. 1. Cor. 11. 16.* The wordes of the former be theis, *Yee goe about to kill me, a man that hath tolde you the truth; This did not Abraham.* The argument is this *Abraham* did not kill any that tolde him the truth, Therefore yee ought not goe about to kill me, if yee would be ſonnes of *Abraham.* This is *Chriſt* his Logicke, wherewith I dare finde no fault: Neither doth *Mr. Gataker.* For he ſaith nothing to it, becauſe the *Printer* putteth for *verſ. 40.* the *48. verſ.* wherewith *Mr. Gataker* maketh paſtime, but I will let paſſe time now to take further knowledge of it. Of the other quotation the wordes be theis. *We have no ſuch cuſtome, nor the Churches of God.* The conſequent implied is, *Therefore women ought*

not

not to pray vncovered. Herevnto *Mr. Gataker* anſwereth indeed, but ſo, that he doth not deny that *Paul* argueth negatively from a matter of *Fact* to a matter of *Right*. Which is all that I intended by the quotation, and not, to imagine this argument. The Churches of God, and faithfull men doe not vſe Lotts in gaming; Therefore ſuch gaming is vnlawfull. So that I neede not herein reply vpon *Mr. Gataker*, I onely wonder that he ſaith. The vſe of Lotts in games hath beene common in the Churches of God. What! In the publicke Aſſemblies? as was the fault of women their heads vncovered in the Church at *Corinth*? But *Mr. Gataker* in this anſwer ſpeaketh of things *merely* naturall, or civill, as ſweetning with ſugar, &c. I will not now indeavour to proove that in the Word there is matter of iuſt conſe-

quence either generall, or implied (which is a part of the propoſition) to allow as well ſweetning with ſugar, &c. as Recreation in generall, and therefore they may be lawfull though they be not mentioned in the Word. But ſuppoſe *M. Gatakers* axiome holdeth in them, what is that to Lotts, wherein is the Name of God by his immediate providence, and the vſe whereof is limited to ende ſerious controverſies? In regard whereof doubt I not but an argument concerning the vſe of them, may holde from the *Negative* in matter of *Fact*, as well as in matter of *Faith*, or of the point of Gods worship for the ſubſtance of it. For I preſume that as *Abraham* would not, if he had had occaſion, as he did not, kill a man that tolde him the truth: ſo that all who feared God, and knew the nature, and vſe of a Lot, would not,

as they did not, vſe a Lot in game.
Secondly. Why may not there be for 2.
a thing permitted, ſome precept in the Word, generall, or implied? The permiſſion of any thing muſt be in the Word, either expreſſe or by iuſt conſequence, and then the thing ſo permitted is indifferent. But *Mr. Gataker* reconſileth theis two axiomes [*Every action is indifferent,*] & [*No action is indifferent,*] thus, Every naked and bare action ſimply conceived, is indifferent: But, No action cladde with his particular circumſtances, is indifferent, *pag. 94.* So that, he concludeth it to be moſt true, That no particular morall action, or No action of the reaſonable creature, proceeding from reaſon, can poſſibly be ſo indifferent, but it muſt of neceſſity, be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or diſconformable therevnto, *pag. 95.*

Theis things, eſpecially theis wordes (Rules of Gods Word, conſidered,) I may ſay, that howſoever a naked indifferent thiug be by permiſſion, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawfull, is by precept, or rule, as well as *Mr. Gataker* ſaith, Recreation in generall, is both by permiſſion, and by precept, if not expreſly, yet by iuſt conſequence *pag. 138.* Doth then *Mr. Gataker* make permiſſion a iuſt exception againſt the Propoſition? Touching his proofe that Permiſſion is a ſuf-
1. ficient warrant: I *firſt* would know what ordinance of God that is, which hath not ſome limited, or appointed vſe thereof. I am ſure, and have shewed, that Gods ordi-
2. nance touching a Lot, hath. *Secondly*, I greive to obſerve what a gappe *Mr. Gataker* hath, by this doctrine, opened to *Licentiouſneſſe*. What! may man diſpoſed to ſinne, imploy

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any creature, whose vse God hath not limited, to what vse he will? No; For here is to be vnderstood that exception which is expressed in the next part of the reason touching circumstances, viz [Any vse, but that which is prohibited] However I could *demurre* therevpon, especially if an expresse prohibition be vnderstood, yet herein I will be silent having enough graunted me. For the vse of Lotts *in game* is prohibited by iust consequences, as I have demonstrated. For the better vnderstanding of the 2. part of the reason, (hasting to an end) I onely desire an answere to this question. Is any vse of a Lot lawfull where the circumstances of *Time*, *Place*, and *Persons* be not determined? If *Mr. Gataker* except an extraordinary vse, I may as well except the lusorious vse of Lotts. In answere to the exemplification

of

of this reaſon, graunting that an argument holdeth from the Negative for the ſubſtance of Gods Worshippe, I yet make this *Quære*. Whether, onely becauſe God hath determined it? For in thoſe places of *Ieremy*, God doth blame his people onely for vſing a worship [*which he commaunded not*], without any intimation that he preſcribed his owne worship. To the ſame purpoſe writeth *Paul* to the *Coloſſians* againſt traditions of men, and will-worship, not for *Mr. Gatakers* cauſe, but becauſe in ſo worshipping they held not the *Head*, *ver. 19.* which is *Chriſt*, King of his Church teaching, and governing the ſame in all things. But in *Deut.* *Mr. Gatakers* cauſe is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other nations ſerved their Gods, and ſendeth them to his word to obſerve

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the ſame, without putting anything to, or taking out from the ſame. Surely, I ſhould not gather from hence *Mr. Gatakers* cauſe, as being the onely cauſe; Becauſe I feare it would incourage *Papiſts* in their ſuperſtitious rites, and ceremonies called *Circumſtances*, though, indeed, parts of the ſubſtance of Gods outward worship. For they are to ready to take holde thereof and ſay God hath determined nothing touching theis ſuppoſed Circumſtances, & they are not againſt the word of God, therefore they are permitted, and ſo warranted. But I ſhould gather from that, and the other places (I thinke *directly*, and not *auckwardly*) this concluſion. Becauſe all things in, & vnto the ſervice of God ought to be *preciſely* according to Gods Will revealed in his word, therefore whatſoever is not commaunded

ought

ought not to be. And the rather (*God being jealous*) becauſe of the meaning of the fringes vpon the *Iſraëlites* their garments, to witt, *That yee may remember all the Commaundements of the Lord, and doe them, and that yee ſeeke not after your owne heart, nor, after your owne eyes, after which yee goe a whoring.* To the laſt I anſwere, That a Lot is no more a Civill affaire, than is an Oath, though it, (as is an Oath,) be vſed in Civill affaires. And *laſtly*, I affirme againe, that God hath determined the vſe of a Lot to determine controverſies, ſo as, without Gods ſpeciall appointment, (which is not now to be expected,) it cannot be lawfully vſed to any other purpoſe; Therefore an argument from the Negative will holde by *Mr. Gatakers* rule, to diſallow the vſe of any other Lot, as well luſorious, as divinatory. Thus having anſwered *Mr. Gatakers*

Exo. 20. 5. Num. 15 39.

taker reasons inducing him to allow Lusorious Lotts as not evill in themselves, and remooved *Mr. Gataker*s answeres to mine arguments, I may more confidently holde mine opinion, which *Mr. Dudley Fenner* (of reverend memory) his godly treatise of Recreations hath taught me, to witt, *That* Tables, *and* Cardes, *as well as* Dice, *and all other games consisting in chaunce*, (*wherein there is use of a Lot*) *are utterly unlawfull.*

ERRATA.

Pag. 6.	Godlesse read	God lesse,
Pag. 13.	fome	some.
Pag. 31.	ye	the:
Pag. 34.	nor	not.
Pag. 42.	with	what.
Pag. 46.	enoug	enough.
Pag. 63.	with	what.
Pag. 75.	obscrved	observed.
Pag. 82.	recreare	recreate
Pag. 86.	bete red	bettered.
Pag. 101:	thei	these.
Pag. 103.	Iserves	It serves.
Pag. 114.	it	is.
Pag. 127.	might,y	mighty,
Pag. 128.	condemneth	condemned.

Pardon the rest, both literall and punctuall.